CONFERENCE AGENDA

LAUNCHING

VIET NAM ANNUAL ECONOMIC REPORT 2015 "INTEGRATION OPPORTUNITIES, INTEGRATION CHALLENGES"

Time: 28th May, 2015

Venue: Red River Ballroom, Sheraton Hanoi K5 - Nghi Tam, 11 Xuan Dieu Str., Tay Ho, Hanoi

08:00 - 08:30	Registration
08:30 - 08:35	Welcome and Introduction
08:35 - 08:45	Opening Remarks by Assoc.Prof. Nguyen Hong Son, Rector of the University of Economics and Business, Vietnam National University, Hanoi
	Welcome Remarks by Mr. Hugh Borrowman, Australian Ambassador
08:45 - 09:15	Introduction on the main contents of the Vietnam Annual Economic Report 2015 Dr. Nguyen Duc Thanh – President of Viet Nam Institute for Economic and Policy Research (VEPR)
09:15 - 10:00	Comments from Economic Experts
	1. Dr. Le Xuan Nghia – Senior Economic Expert
	2. Dr. Le Dang Doanh – Senior Economic Expert
	3. Dr. Huynh The Du – Academic Director of the Fulbright Economics Teaching Program
10:00 - 10:15	Tea Break
10:15 - 11:55	Open discussion
11:55 - 12:00	Closing Statement by Assoc. Prof. Nguyen Hong Son, Rector of UEB, VNU

ORGANIZATION BOARD







VIETNAM ANNUAL ECONOMIC REPORT 2015

Edited by Nguyen Duc Thanh & Nguyen Thi Thu Hang

INTEGRATION OPPORTUNITIES, INTEGRATION CHALLENGES

Supported by



Vietnam National University



University of Economics and Business VNU



Australian Aid

Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade **Australian Government**

INTEGRATION OPPORTUNITIES, INTEGRATION CHALLENGES

Viet Nam Annual Economic Report 2015

INTEGRATION OPPORTUNITIES, INTEGRATION CHALLENGES

Copyright © 2015 by Viet Nam Institute for Economic and Policy Research (VEPR), University of Economics and Business, Vietnam National University, Hanoi

All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced in any form.

Contact:



Viet Nam Institute for Economic and Policy Research (VEPR)

University of Economics and Business, Vietnam National University, Hanoi

Address: Room 707, E4 Building, 144 Xuan Thuy, Cau Giay district, Hanoi, Vietnam.

Tel: (84) 4 37547506 – Ext: 704

Fax: (84) 4 37549921 Email: info@vepr.org.vn Website: www.vepr.org.vn

Cover image: *To Troi* by Truong Be (2014, *lacquer*, 60x60 cm), collection of Nguyen Duc Thanh

PREFACE

Viet Nam Annual Economic Report is a major product of one of Vietnam National University's key research directions and has been conducted annually since 2009 by the Viet Nam Institute for Economic and Policy Research of the University of Economics and Business. The primary purpose of the Report is to provide scientific evidence for macroeconomic policy-making for Vietnam based on reviewing and analyzing the major achievements, difficulties, opportunities, and challenges for the Vietnamese economy. In addition, the Report also discusses in-depth selected macroeconomic issues of the country while maintaining an objective and independent point of view.

As usual, around May, VEPR launches the Report, bringing researchers, policy makers, and Vietnamese readers the latest results after a year of meticulous research on macroeconomic situations and specific issues of Vietnam's economy. In-depth discussion in each chapter of the report, which results from modern approaches and is based on empirical evidence, statistics, and analysis that has been updated and thoroughly discussed, has increased the reputation of the Reports and helped them become the flagship, not only of VEPR, but also of Vietnam National University of Hanoi.

Though the Report is launched in the first half of the year, it thoroughly discusses fundamental economic issues for the whole year, and its forecasts exhibit a high degree of accuracy. The Report was developed by a team of renowned domestic researchers and foreign experts. During the process of publication, the Reports receive critique and suggestions, in many forums, from Vietnam's leading experts in macroeconomics, international economics, finance – banking, etc.

With significant contributions, the Reports have become a reference material for managers, policy makers, researchers, and those concerned with macroeconomic issues in Vietnam.

Given the 2014 Report focusing on the analysis and study of growth in the mid-term and long-term of Viet Nam, this year report focuses on the opportunities as well as challenges for Viet Nam when the country is accelerating towards a deeper global integration with many FTAs heading to the final rounds of negotiation. This tendency opens up many considerable chances for the socio-economic development of Viet Nam, yet it also raises fundamental

questions such as whether the country is ready to truly integrate into the regional and global economy.

We believe that the *Viet Nam Annual Economic Report 2015: Integration Opportunities, Integration Challenges* will continue to bring to readers, who are familiarized with the Report series during the last five years, useful information, thoughtful questions, and provoking discussions on the fundamental issues of Vietnam's economy

.

Hanoi, May 25th, 2015

Phung Xuan Nha

President of Vietnam National University, Hanoi

ABOUT VEPR

VIET NAM INSTITUTE FOR ECONOMIC AND POLICY (VEPR), formerly known as Vietnam Centre for Economic and Policy Research, was established on July 7, 2008 as a research centre under the University of Economics and Business of Vietnam National University, Hanoi (VNU). VEPR has legal status and headquarters are located in the University of Economics and Business (UEB), Xuan Thuy, Cau Giay, Hanoi.

VEPR considers its primary mission as carrying out economic and policy research to assist in improving the decision-making quality of policy-making institutions, enterprises, and interest groups by providing insights into the social, political, and economic factors that drive the economic affairs of Vietnam and the region. The main activities of VEPR include (i) providing quantitative and qualitative analysis of changing economic conditions in Vietnam and assessments of their impacts on various interest groups throughout the country; (ii) organizing policy dialogues among policy-makers, entrepreneurs, and other stakeholders to improve solutions to emerging issues; and (iii) conducting advanced training courses in economics, finance and policy analysis regularly and upon request.

CONTRIBUTORS

Pham Van Dai: PhD candidate in Economics and Finance, Flinders Business School, Flinders University, Adelaide, Australia; expert of the Economic Research Department, Maritime Bank Vietnam.

Nguyen Thi Thu Hang: PhD in Macroeconomics and Finance at New York University, the United States. Nguyen Thi Thu Hang is the Chief economist of VEPR with expertise on macroeconomics, monetary policy, business cycle, imperfect information, and credit risk modelling.

Ken Itakura: PhD in Agricultural Economics from Purdue University, U.S.; expert in Applied Economic Modelling and GTAP model; Professor at Faculty of Economics, Nagoya City University; Member of American Economic Association, Japan Society of International Economics and Pan Pacific Association of Input-Output Studies.

Vu Minh Long: BA in Finance from La Trobe University, Australia; researcher at Viet Nam Institute for Economic and Policy Research (VEPR).

Dinh Tuan Minh: attended PhD Programme on Economics Studies of Technical Change in a joint research and training institute of United Nations University and Maastricht University; MA in Technological Economics from Asia Institute of Technology (AIT); experts on Austrian Economics School, public economics, institutional economics, economics of technology innovation and industrial organization. Dinh Tuan Minh is currently a senior researcher at National Institute for Science and Technology Policy and Strategy Studies (NISPASS).

Nguyen Thi Linh Nga: BA in Global Political Economy, School of Political Science and Economics, Waseda University, Japan; researcher at Viet Nam Institute for Economic and Policy Research (VEPR).

Nguyen Cam Nhung: MA In international Economics and PhD in Economics from the National University of Yokohama, Japan; lecturer of Economics and International Business, at the Economics University, Vietnam National University Hanoi.

Le Kim Sa: MA in Economics from Brown University, USA; PhD in economics at the Institute of World Economics, Academy of Social Sciences of Vietnam (completed training program as a graduate student at Georgetown University, USA); senior researcher and Vice Director at the Centre for Analysis and Forecast, the Academy of Social Sciences of Vietnam and Associate Editor of the Journal Asia - Pacific.

Nguyen Quang Thai: BA with High Distinction in Corporate Finance from School of Banking and Finance, National Economic University; awarded Third Prize in Ministerial Young Scientific Talent Award in 2012; researcher at Viet Nam Institute for Economic and Policy Research (VEPR).

Ngo Quoc Thai: BA in Economics from Australian National University (through the cooperation program with National Economics University in 2012); the 2nd prize (with no 1st prize awarded) in VEPR's Student Research Competition in 2010; researcher at Viet Nam Institute for Economic and Policy Research (VEPR).

Nguyen Duc Thanh: PhD in Development Economics from the National Graduate Institute for Policy Studies (GRIPS), Tokyo, Japan; member of the Macroeconomic Advisory Group (MAG) of the National Assembly's Economic Committee; member of the Macroeconomic Advisory Group for the Prime Minister; President of Viet Nam Institute for Economic and Policy Research (VEPR).

Hoang Thi Chinh Thon: MA in Economics with distinction from the National Economics University in 2011; lecturer of National Economics University; collaborator of VEPR, pursing a master degree at the Fulbright Economics Teaching Program, University of Economics, HCMC.

Nguyen Thanh Tung: BA in Economics at National Economics University, Hanoi; researcher at Viet Nam Institute for Economic and Policy Research (VEPR).

BOARD OF ADVISORS AND COMMENTATORS

Dr. Nguyen Dinh Cung (President, Central Institute for Economic Management),

Dr. Le Dang Doanh (Senior Economic Expert, Former President of Central Institute for Economic Management),

Prof. Dr. Nguyen Huu Duc (Vice President, Vietnam National University, Ha Noi),

Dr. Le Hong Giang (Director of Foreign Exchange Fund, Tactical Global Management),

Dr. Luu Bich Ho (Senior Economic Expert, Former President of Development Strategy Institute, Ministry of Planning and Investment),

Dr. Tran Viet Ky (President, Center for Investment, Consultancy and Commerce – Intervina),

Mrs. Pham Chi Lan (Senior Economic Expert, Former Vice Chairman of Vietnam Chamber of Commerce and Industry),

Assoc. Prof. Dr. Le Bo Linh (Vice Chairman, Committee for Science and Technology, National Assembly Office),

Prof. Dr. Sc. Vo Dai Luoc (General Director of Vietnam Asia – Pacific Economic Center, Commissioner of National Council for Financial and Monetary Policy),

Dr. Le Xuan Nghia (Commissioner of National Council for Financial and Monetary Policy),

Dr. Vu Viet Ngoan (Chairman of Vietnam's National Financial Supervisory Commission),

Assoc. Prof. Dr. Phung Xuan Nha (President, Vietnam National University, Ha Noi),

Dr. Le Hong Nhat (Faculty of Economics, Vietnam National University, Ho Chi Minh City),

Assoc. Prof. Dr. Nguyen Hong Son (Rector, University of Economics and Business, Vietnam National University, Ha Noi),

Prof. Dr.Sc. Nguyen Quang Thai (Standing Vice President cum General Secretary of Vietnam Economic Association),

Dr. Vo Tri Thanh (Vice President, Central Institute for Economic Management),

Dr. Le Le Thuy (Director, Center for Investment, Consultancy and Commerce – Intervina),

Mr. Truong Dinh Tuyen (Former Minister of Ministry of Commerce, Commissioner of National Council for Financial and Monetary Policy),

Dr. Dinh Quang Ty (Scientific Secretary for Economic Issues, Vietnam Communist Party's Central Theoretical Council).

EDITING TEAM

Nguyen Duc Thanh Vu Minh Long

Nguyen Thi Thu Hang Nguyen Thanh Tung

Pham Sy Thanh Nguyen Quang Thai

Pham Tuyet Mai Nguyen Thuy Hang

Hoang Thi Chinh Thon Duong Van Nga

Ngo Quoc Thai Nguyen Khac Giang

Nguyen Thi Linh Nga Nguyen Thi Thanh Tu

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

Viet Nam Annual Economic Report 2015 by the Viet Nam Institute for Economic and Policy Research, University of Economics and Business, Vietnam National University, Hanoi is accomplished with the support from many individuals and organizations.

First and foremost, the authors would like to express gratitude to the Board of Presidents of Vietnam National University, Hanoi – especially President Phung Xuan Nha and Vice-President Nguyen Huu Duc, the Board of Directors of University of Economics and Business, especially Rector Nguyen Hong Son, those who have encouraged and enthusiastically supported the authors during the last six years to conduct the Report series.

One of the most important contributions that must be mentioned is from *the Board of Advisors and Commentators*, who have participated in many discussions, workshops, and seminars during different stages of the Report. Thanks are due to Dr. Le Dang Doanh, Dr. Luu Bich Ho, Asoc. Prof. Dr. Le Bo Linh, Dr. Vu Viet Ngoan, Dr. Le Xuan Nghia, Prof. Dr. Sc. Nguyen Quang Thai, Dr. Vo Tri Thanh, Dr. Huynh The Du and Dr. Dinh Quang Ty for their deep analyses and constructive feedback of each chapter of the Report.

We are grateful to Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Australian Government for their generous support and cooperation for Vietnam Annual Economic Report.

We are greatly helped by VEPR staffs, especially *the editing team* and proofreaders. Their enthusiasm, dedication, and persistence are an indispensable part of this Report.

We would like to express our gratitude to the members of the Department of Science and Technology at Vietnam National University - Hanoi and Department for Research and International Relations at the University of Economics and Business for their enthusiastic support during the project.

Despite our efforts, we understand that there may be limitations and even errors in the Report. We sincerely hope to receive comments and contributions from the readers to improve our upcoming reports.

Hanoi, May 25th, 2015, On behalf of the Contributors, Dr. Nguyen Duc Thanh

CONTENTS

Preface	V
About VEPR	vii
Contributors	viii
Board of Advisors and Commentators	X
Editing Team	xi
Acknowledgements	xii
Contents	xiii
List of Figures	XV
List of Tables	xix
List of Abbreviations	xxii
Executive Summary	1
Chapter 1: Overview of the World Economy in 2014	
Introduction	11
The global economic growth shifted to a "new normal" stage	13
The global unemployment remained high	17
Global trade remained sluggish	20
Major trade negotiations could not be concluded	23
Global capital flows reduced slightly	24
Decline in commodity prices	26
Major economies continued to loosen their monetary policies	30
Flexible fiscal policies	34
Prospects for 2015 and beyond	39
Implications for Viet Nam	42
References	44
Chapter 2: Overview of the Vietnamese Economy in 2014	
Introduction	45
Aggregate Supply	50
Aggregate Demand	54
Macroeconomic balances	58
Capital market and money market	62
Property markets	67
Implications	69
References	71
Chapter 3: The Instability behind the Stability of the Nominal	
Exchange Rate	73
Introduction	73
Estimating the equilibrium exchange rate for Viet Nam	75
Impact of overvaluation on domestic production: Using CGE model	93
Conclusions and implications	97
References	98
Chapter 4: Macro-prudential Analysis for Viet Nam's Banking Sector in 2015 - An Application of Stress Testing	
Introduction	100
	xiv

	Content
Literature review of stress testing	101
The application of stress testing in Viet Nam	115
Constructing a stress test to evaluate the vulnerability of selected	
Vietnamese banks	118
Conclusions and implications	132
References	134
Chapter 5: Gains and Losses from TPP - An assessment for Viet Nam using	g GTAP model
Introduction	137
Overview of TPP	138
Literature review	145
TPP impact assessment for Viet Nam: Using GTAP model	145
Conclusions and implications	159
References	161
Appendix	163
Chapter 6: Toward the sustainable integration of Vietnam's rice	
market: a market structure approach	173
Introduction	173
Methodology	174
Characteristics and structure of the world's rice market	177
Overview of Viet Nam's rice industry	183
Structure of Viet Nam's rice market	188
The changing trend of Viet Nam's rice market structure	204
Discussions about current policy on rice	206
Conclusions and recommendations	209
References	212
Appendix	215

LIST OF FIGURES

Figure 1.1. Global FDI, 2007-2014 (billion USD)	24
Figure 1.2. FDI by Country Group, 2012-2014 (billion USD)	25
Figure 1.3.Top 10 FDI Recipient (billion USD)	25
Figure 1.4. Brent Crude Oil Spot Price, 1/2000-3/2015 (USD/barrel)	28
Figure 1.5. FAO Food Price Index	28
Figure 1.6. Forecasts of Budget Deficit and Public Debts of Selected	
Economies, 2015 (% of GDP)	41
Figure 2.1. Economic growth rate by sector, 2005-2014 (% yoy)	46
Figure 2.2. Trend of economic growth, 1991Q1-2015Q1 (% yoy)	47
Figure 2.3. Cycle index and smoothed cycle index, 1991Q1-2015Q1	47
Figure 2.4. GDP by sector, 2004-2014 (% GDP)	48
Figure 2.5. Monthly inflation rate, 11/2009-4/2015(% yoy)	49
Figure 2.6. Growth of gross output, 2001-2014 (%, yoy)	50
Figure 2.7. Selected Industrial Indices, 2/2013-12/2014(% yoy)	51
Figure 2.8. Purchasing Manager Index, 4/2011-12/2014	52
Figure 2.9. Sales of goods and services versus FMCG, 2013-2014, (% yoy)	54
Figure 2.10. Foreign Direct Investment, 2006-2014 (billion USD and % GDP)	55
Figure 2.11. Growth of trade and balance of trade, 2004-2014 (% yoy and % of	
exports)	57
Figure 2.12. Annual budget deficit as percentage of GDP, 2005-2014	
(thousand billion VND and % of GDP)	58
Figure 2.13. Foreign exchange reserve (billion USD and month of imports)	60
Figure 2.H3. Import coverage (month)	61
Figure 2.14. Rebalancing growth and stability, 2003 - 2014	61
Figure 2.15. Operating interest rate, 2012-2014 (%)	62
Figure 2.16. Outstanding bonds in VND, 2010-2014 (trillion VND)	63
Figure 2.17. Money supply and credit growth, 2001-2014 (%)	65
Figure 2.18. Nominal exchange rate, 2014 (VND/USD)	66
Figure 2.19. HOSE's VN Index	67
Figure 2.20. Gold price, 11/2013-12/2014 (million VND/tael)	68
Figure 3.1. Real Effective Exchange Rate, 1995-2014 (2000 = 100%)	82
Figure 3.2. Real Exchange Rate Adjusted for Trade with China, 2010-2014	
(2012=100%)	82
Figure 3.3. Bilateral Real Exchange Rate with China, the US, Japan and the	
EU, 2005-2014 (2005 = 100%)	83
Figure 3.4. Dollar Index	84
Figure 3.5. REER of Selected Countries in the Region, 2005-2014	
(2005=100%)	84
Figure 3.H1. Gross profit/Revenue of Seafood Production Companies and	0.6
REER, 2010-2014	96
Figure 4.1. Macro-prudential Analysis Framework	101
Figure 4.2. Overdue and Non-performing Loans of Viet Nam's banking sector,	120
2011-2013 (%)	120

Figure 4.3. Net Interest Margin to Gross Income of Selected Banks, 2009-2013	
(%)	120
Figure 4.4. Net Open Position of the Selected Banks, 2009-2013 (%)	121
Figure 4.5. Investment and Trading Securities of the Selected Banks, 2013	
(thousand billion VNĐ)	122
Figure 4.6. Estimated CAR of the Selected Banks in 2015 (%)	130
Figure 5.1. Exports by major trade partners, 1990-2014	143
Figure 5.2. Imports by major trade partners, 1990-2014	144
Figure 5.3. Viet Nam's Imports (million USD) and tariff (%)	147
Figure 5.4. Viet Nam's Exports (million USD) and tariff (%)	148
Figure 5.5. Tariff Equivalent of Reduction of Services Trade Barrier (%)	149
Figure 5.6. Time Delay that can be Reduced (day)	149
Figure 5.7. Components of change in real GDP (%)	152
Figure 5.8. Simulation result on investment (million USD)	152
Figure 5.9. Change in imports (million USD)	153
Figure 5.10. Change in exports (million USD)	155
Figure 5.11. Change in output by sector	156
Figure 5.12. Change in labour demand by sector, b scenario	157
Figure 5.13. Change in welfare, b scenario	158
Figure 6. 1. Traditional SCP paradigm	174
Figure 6.2. Total rice production and total harvest area, 1961-2013 (million ton;	
million hectare)	178
Figure 6.3. Prices of selected types of rice, 3/2000-4/2015 (USD/ton)	181
Figure 6.4. Viet Nam's price production and harvest area, 1990-2013 (million	400
hectare, million ton)	183
Figure 6.5. Rice production by region, 2013 (%)	183
Figure 6.6. Farm size, by region, 2010	184
Figure 6.7. Viet Nam's rice exports, 2000-2013 (million ton, million USD)	186
Figure 6.8. Viet Nam's rice exports by country, 2010-2013 (% exports)	187
Figure 6.9. Share of G2G in Viet Nam's rice exports, 2007-2012 (%)	187
Figure 6. 10. Major types of exported rice, 2009 - 2013 (million ton)	188
Figure 6.11. Viet Nam's rice value chain	189
Figure 6.12. Function of miller and polishing firms in Mekong Delta, 2013 (%)	197
Figure 6.13. Share of top 10 Viet Nam's rice exporters, 2012 (%)	199

LIST OF TABLES

Table 1.1. Economic Growth 2012-2014 (%)	13
Table 1.2. The World's Labour Market (2010-2013)	17
Table 1.3. Unemployment Rate in Selected Economies and Areas in OECD, 2012-2014 (%)	18
Table 1.4. Growth of Trade in Goods and Services, 2011-2015 (%)	20
Table 1.5. Balance of Current Account, 2011-2015	21
Table 1.6. Budget Deficit in Selected Economies, 2009–2014	34
Table 1.7. Public Debt in Selected Economies, 2009–2014	35
Table 1.8. Forecast of the World's Economic Growth in 2015	42
Table 3.1. Correlation of Net Imports from China and Errors in Balance of Payments	81
Table 3.2. Input Data for Estimation of Equilibrium Exchange Rate	89
Table 3.3. Regression Result of Equilibrium Exchange Rate Model	89
Table 3.4. Exchange Rate Misalignment of Selected Countries in Region, 1996-2013	92
Table 3.5. Impact of Exchange Rate Misalignment to Production Sector (%)	94
Table 4.1. Micro-prudential and Macro-prudential Stress Tests	104
Table 4.2. Bottom-up and Top-down Stress Tests	105
Table 4.3. Components of a Stress Test	108
Table 4.4. Proportion of Total Assets of Banks in the International Studies' Samples	118
Table 4.5. Baseline Scenario	123
Table 4.7. Scenario 1	124
Table 4.6. Scenario 2	125
Table 4.8. An Example of Estimating Non-performing Loans during 2014-2015 for BIDV (million VND)	126
Table 4.9. Recapitalization Cost for the Banking Sector of Selected Countries	131
Table 5.1. TPP Negotiation Rounds as of May, 2015	138
Table 5.2. Major Issues of Trans-Pacific Partnership	163
Table 5.P1. Top 10 Viet Nam's Exported Goods to TPP Members in 2013	169
Table 5.P2. Top 10 Viet Nam's Imported goods from TPP Members in 2013	169
Table 5.P3. Trade of Viet Nam to TPP Members in 2014	170
Table 5.P4. Aggregate Region in GTAP	171
Table 5.P5. Aggregate Sector in GTAP	172
Table 5.P6. Impact of TPP on real GDP (change in % and million USD)	173
Table 6.1. Rice Production and Consumption, 2014 (million ton)	177
Table 6.2. The World Agriculture Towards 2020-2050 (million ton)	178
Table 6.3. Top 5 Rice Exporters and Importers, 2013/2014	179

Table 6.4. Comparison of CR4 versus HHI between exporters and importers, 2000-	
2008	180
Table 6.5. Emerging exporters and traditional importers, 2009 -2014 (thousand ton)	182
Table 6.6. Changes in intensive cultivation in Mekong Delta, 1980-2010	185
Table 6.7. Assessing Efficiency of Rice Production before and after Participating Large Scale Farming Model, 2014	192
Table 6.8. The Characteristics of Collectors	194
Table 6.9. The Characteristics of Millers, Polishing Firms and Exporter, 2013	196
Table 6.P1. Summary of Rice Market Structure-Conduct-Performance	215

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

ABS Asset Backed Security
ADB Asian Development Bank
AFTA ASEAN Free Trade Area

AGIMEX An Giang Import Export Company
APEC Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation

ARIMA Autoregressive Integrated Moving Average ASEAN Association of Southeast Asian Nations

BIS Bank for International Settlements

BOJ Bank of Japan

BRER Bilateral Real Exchange Rate
BSC BIDV Securities Company
C.I.F Cost, Insurance and Freight
CAR Capital Adequacy Ratio
CCI Consumer Confidence Index

CEIC Euromoney Institutional Investor Company

CGE Computable General Equilibrium

CIEM Central Institute for Economic Management

CNY Chinese Yuan

CPI Consumer Price Index

DFID Department for International Development

DOTS Direction of Trade Statistics ECB European Central Bank

ERER Equilibrium Real Exchange Rate

EU European Union F.O.B Free On Board

FAO Food and Agriculture Organization

FDI Foreign Direct Investment FED Federal Reserve System

FEER Fundamental Equilibrium Exchange Rate

FMCG Fast-moving Consumer Goods

FSAP Financial Sector Assessment Program

FSIs Financial Soundness Indicators

FTA Free Trade Agreement

G2G Government to Government
GDP Gross Domestic Product

GMM Generalized Method of Moments GMP Good Manufacturing Practices

GMP-RM

GSO General Statistics Office

GTAP Global Trade Analysis Project

HS Harmonized System

HSBC The Hong Kong and Shanghai Banking Corporation

IEA International Energy Agency
 IFS International Financial Statistics
 ILO International Labour Organization
 IMF International Monetary Fund

INSEE French National Institute for Statistics and Economic Studies

IP Intellectual Property

IPI Index of Industrial Production

IPSARD Institute of Policy and Strategy for Agriculture and Rural Development

JA Japan Agricultural Cooperatives

JICA Japan International Cooperation Agency

LDP Liberal Democratic Party

M&A Mergers And Acquisitions

MAFF Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries

MBS MB Securities

MITI Ministry of International Trade and Industry

MOF Ministry of Finance

NFSC National Financial Supervisory Commission

NGO Non-governmental Organization
ODA Official Development Assistance

OECD Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development

OLS Ordinary Least Squares

OPEC Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries

PBC People's Bank of China PD Probability of Default

PMI Purchasing Managers Index
PPP Purchasing Power Parity
OE Ouantitative Easing

Quantition (2 mong

R&D Research and Development

RCA Revealed Comparative Advantage

RCEP Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership

REER Real Effective Exchange Rate

RER Real Exchange Rate
ROO Rule of Origin

RWA RWA

SCP Structure-Conduct-Performance

TFP Total Factor Productivity
TNCs Transnational Corporations
TPA Trade Promotion Authority

TPP Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement

TPSEP Trans-Pacific Strategic Economic Partnership

TRIPS Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights

TTIP Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership

UN United Nations

UNCTAD United Nations Conference on Trade and Development

UNU-WIDER The United Nations University, World Institute for Development Economics Research

USD United States dollar

USDA U.S. Department of Agriculture

VAMC Vietnam Asset Management Company

VaR Value-at Risk

VAR Vector Autoregression

VAT Value Added Tax

VCBS Vietcombank Securities
VFA Vietnam Food Association

VNCB Construction Bank
VND Viet Nam dong
WB World Bank

WDI World Development Indicators

WGC World Gold Council

WIPO World Intellectual Property Organization

WPI Wholesale Price Index
WTO World Trade Organization

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The content of the *Viet Nam Annual Economic Report 2015*, in addition to two chapters evaluating and commenting on the world and Viet Nam's economic situation in 2014, is devoted to the analysis of specific issues of Viet Nam when the country prepares to take a further step into the integration and globalization process. These include gains and losses when the TPP is concluded; instability behind the country's exchange rate policy when Viet Nam is integrating more deeply into international trade; problems of Viet Nam's rice market structure; and the vulnerability of the banking sector under hypothetical events or scenarios in the coming time. Finally, the Report presents general observations about the economic outlook for 2015 and suggests policies to support the country's upcoming integration process.

THE WORLD ECONOMY IN 2014 AND PROSPECT OF 2015

After six years, the worst effects of the global crisis have faded out among the countries but the world economy has not been able to achieve its peak performance as seen in the pre-crisis period and has moved to a "new normal" stage characterised by modest growth. The global economic growth in 2014 was slightly higher than in 2012 and 2013, but still fell significantly lower than the initial forecast launched earlier this year by international institutions like the IMF and the World Bank. Within the context of sustained low economic growth, global unemployment also has not improved yet. Alarmingly, youth unemployment has remained high since the crisis although there have been efforts to improve education for the young labor force. This is a warning situation because the cyclical unemployment has carried out for too long. That might be the cause of a gradual loss of job skills and become a contributor to structural unemployment.

Global trade is still depressed with low growth in 2014. In recent years, the production network of global value chains has been segmented, leading to a decrease in the value of global trade and reducing the trade elasticity to global incomes. In addition, the remarkable increase in the application of technical barriers on trade from the G20 from the end of 2008 has prevented the recovery of global trade. Several new factors unexpectedly arose which included the Ebola epidemic outbreaks in West Africa, armed conflicts in the Middle East, the prolonged oil price depression, geopolitical tensions between Russia and Ukraine and the West, and the currency fluctuations which have put pressure on global trade flows over the last year.

The steady fall of the oil price hit not only the current account balance of the OPEC members and several emerging economies such as Russia and Brazil, but also caused a major impact on state budgets of the countries in two ways. It was positive for countries with a large demand for imported oil and negative for those economies which depend on oil export revenues. Falling oil prices have also had a direct impact on prices and an indirect impact on many sectors such as transport, petrochemicals, agriculture and some manufacturing sectors. Thanks to lower fuel costs, along with further improvements in agricultural production and conditions of food supply, prices of most types of main products reduced. However, lower prices of inputs have increased fears of deflation for developing economies. As inflation fell below the 2% target in most major economies, their central banks decided to continue to maintain low interest rates in 2014.

As the global economic growth remained modest and fragile, the conflicts and geopolitical instability have also prevented the flow of foreign investment, especially from the developed countries which has mitigated the flow of global FDI. However, transnational M & A remained robust and recovery rose from 2011 to a peak at present. The TNCs have aggressively expanded their business strategies to make the total value of new investment deals rise slightly in the past year.

Mixed trends continue in 2015, which might lead to a mixed affect on world growth in general and Viet Nam in particular. First, the US is expected to tighten monetary policy by interest rate instruments in June 2015. That may cause certain pressure on the exchange rates for many countries, including Viet Nam where a stronger dollar would require the exchange rate policy to be more flexible. For foreign debt, if the US dollar rose sharply in the coming period, the dollar-debt may have to bear a higher cost.

Second, China's growth slowed in a more sustainable way which might help it maintain inflation at a low level so the countries which depend on exports from China, such as Viet Nam, will also benefit from low costs. However, the quality of products imported from China should be subject to tighter controls.

Third, the oil price in the future will gradually increase slightly due to world supply which has narrowed following the peak seen in early 2014. With this trend, the transportation from individuals and households to businesses will no longer benefit from the reduction in oil price seen in 2014. As both a producer and consumer of gasoline, Viet Nam's state budget revenues

from the export of crude oil will be improved. But as the price of petroleum products will tend to rise, the rising cost of production could put pressure on the consumer price index in 2015.

Fourth, as economic forecasts for the US, Europe and Japan, the largest trade partners of Viet Nam, tend to be more optimistic in 2015, this may be more favourable year for the export of goods from Viet Nam. However, Vietnamese enterprises still need to continue to improve the quality of their products to meet the demand in these strict markets with their system of technical barriers to trade.

Fifth, the political tensions in the East Sea has made FDI flows move out of China and shift to its neighbouring countries. In addition, the global M&A will continue to grow especially in the financial sector and made by TNCs from the developed economies and emerging economies. Therefore, Viet Nam needs to continue to improve the investment environment to become more competitive in embracing this trend. However, Viet Nam will also need to select FDI flows consistent with development plans and sectors, especially the selection of partners interested in agriculture, forestry and fisheries.

OVERVIEW OF THE VIETNAMESE ECONOMY IN 2014

Although the world's economy recovered at an uneven rate, maintained a slow growth pattern and sluggish trade, the annual economic growth rate of Viet Nam in 2014 outperformed the government's target and most forecasts. Being the main driver of growth, the industrial sector accelerated thanks to enhanced condition and improved, higher demand from both foreign and domestic markets. The economic structure showed several constrained that hindered economic growth. The long-term growth trend has not recovered to pre-2008 levels. Domestic firms struggled yet lagged behind the foreign sector in accessing resources and expanding production.

Although inflation has dropped to the lowest level since 2000, the improvement in consumption was inconclusive. Consumer confidence rose slightly in the second half of 2014, signalling signs of improvement in 2015. Investment and credit grew moderately. Investment was led by foreign sector, mainly in industrial manufacturing.

Macroeconomic balances saw less signs of stress. The balance of payments improved thanks to record surplus in current accounts and financial account. The foreign exchange reserve expanded markedly, which raise financial security. In contrast, the state budget could not reign in current expenditure, achieving lower budget deficit at the expense of development

investment. Despite the narrowed deficit, the State budget remained unbalanced and unsustainable due to the structural deficit. New issuance of government bonds not only covered budget deficit but also rolled over matured bonds.

The State Bank cut the operating interest rates in March by 50 basis points. State-owned enterprises' privatisation was resumed although there were not any stocks tradable in the secondary market. The SOEs' initial public offering also did not attract foreign investors.

Credit growth slightly improved thanks to credit in foreign currency green-lighted by the State Bank after growth of credit in Vietnam dong fell behind expectation. Higher demand for foreign exchanges pressurized the State Bank to intervene using its reserve and raise the reference exchange rate by 1% in June. The appreciation of real exchange rate implied negative impact on exported goods.

The banking system underwent the restructuring process while there still remained uncertainty about the true soundness of banks. Non-performing loans might have reduced but remained above the safe threshold. The disposal of NPLs faced legal issues regarding the handling of collaterals in the form of land.

The domestic gold price declined due to falling demand for hedging against inflation and demand for investment due to the USD appreciation. The stock markets fluctuated widely, managed to rise after two cycles. The real estate market warmed up mostly in the affordable and social housing segments.

VIETNAM'S EXCHANGE RATE AND ITS IMPACTS ON THE DOMESTIC PRODUCTION

Estimating the equilibrium exchange rate is essential to design exchange rate policy and predict the movement of the actual exchange rate. Chapter 3 presents two methods to estimate the equilibrium exchange rate in Vietnam which are based on the purchasing power parity (PPP) and general equilibrium approaches. The regression method based on the general equilibrium approach appears to lead to better result than the real effective exchange rate proposed by the PPP approach. Nevertheless, both methods indicate the appreciation trend of VND over the period 2011-2014. It is found that VND is overvalued at 7-11% at the end of 2014.

While the growth-enhancing effect of undervaluation is recently at the centre of economic and policy debates, there is a consensus on the negative impact of overvaluation on economic performance in developing economies. For that reason, we argue for an appropriate process to attain the competitiveness of the domestic currency, at least at the equilibrium level. Consequently, the first step is to curb the appreciation trend of VND. It requires that the devaluation of the nominal exchange rate is not less than the gap between domestic and global inflation. Notably, because the equilibrium exchange rate is considered over the medium term rather than short term, overvaluation is not necessarily accompanied by a decrease in foreign reserve. Foreign reserve can be affected and increased by short-term factors such as international remittance and short-term foreign borrowing. Therefore, determining exchange rate police based on the position of balance of payments could result in disequilibrium and erosion of the economy's competitiveness.

Empirical analysis using the computable general equilibrium model shows that overvaluation negatively influences industries of which inputs are mainly domestically originated, for example agriculture, agricultural product processing, heavy industries, mining and light labor-intensive industries. Importantly, these industries play an essential role in reducing unemployment and improving the economy's productivity. On the other side, overvaluation helps boost consumption and industries of which production inputs are mainly overseas imported such as capital-intensive industries.

MACROPRUDENTIAL ANALYSIS FOR VIET NAM'S BANKING SECTOR IN 2015 - AN APPLICATION OF STRESS TESTING

While Viet Nam is integrating deeper into the world economy, the banking sector, as the blood stream of the economy, will have to face with many risks from macroeconomic instability, which may come from both internal capacity and external environment. The evaluation of the vulnerability of Viet Nam's banking sector, therefore, becomes important for researchers and policymakers to propose effective implications and adjustments, in order to avoid negative consequences to the economy in the future.

The key method to perform the evaluation is to construct stress tests to measure the vulnerability of the banking sector under hypothetical events or scenarios. These scenarios must be extreme/exceptional and plausible. On that basis, this chapter designs a framework for a solvency stress test to analyze 13 Vietnamese banks in 2015, which covers credit risk, exchange rate risk, interest rate risk, and security price risk.

The two scenarios are constructed by different approaches. The first one is based on 1% 'tail' events from a VAR model for macroeconomic variables like GDP growth, inflation, lending rates and nominal VND/USD exchange rate, and an ARIMA model for VN-Index. The second one chooses extreme episodes of the economy between QI/1996 and QIV/2014. After constructing these two scenarios, the authors estimate the capital adequacy ratio (CAR) for the selected banks, and the refinancing cost for the whole sector.

If no shock occurs, the economy might perform under the base scenario, and banks' CAR are all higher than State Bank of Viet Nam's required ratio of 9%. However, this will not happen in the two hypothetical scenarios. While in the first scenario only four banks still keep CAR at adequate level, the second scenario shows that no banks have CAR higher than 9%. In that case, State Bank of Viet Nam will have to recapitalize in order to avoid the collapse of the whole sector. Based on authors' calculation, the recapitalization cost in the two scenarios will be about 1.50% and 2.97% of GDP in 2015.

Under the above results, the authors propose some recommendations for banks to improve their health under shocks, such as retaining more profits or mobilizing more capital from current shareholders and external investors. Banks can also reduce their risk-weighted assets by cutting high-risk assets and increasing low-risk assets, like collecting more debt, keeping more liquid assets and decreasing lending. Moreover, banks also need to undertake stress tests by themselves or provide information and data for supervisory offices or researchers. Finally, in order to avoid macroeconomic shocks, the banking sector should operate in a stable environment, which is a result of synchronous monetary and fiscal policies, in both short-term and long-term.

GAINS AND LOSSES FROM THE TPP: AN ASSESSMENT FOR VIET NAM USING GTAP MODEL

Viet Nam's deeper integration into the global economy, especially when via such a comprehensive free trade agreement as the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), brings various opportunities and challenges at the same time. Previous studies on impacts of the TPP on signatory countries gave a promising economic prospect for Viet Nam, which is going to be the largest beneficiary compared to other 11 TPP countries. However, in order to make the best of the opportunities and overcome the challenges, Viet Nam needs fundamentals changes in economic structure, institutions and governing policies.

This chapter attempts to make a quantitative evaluation of potential economic impacts of liberalizing trade in goods and services under the TPP on Viet Nam. Based on the recently published Global Trade Analysis Project (GTAP) Data Base version 9 and the GTAP model, we conduct a set of numerical experiments to simulate the economic effects arising from establishing TPP. We assume that bilateral tariffs on trade in goods among TPP member countries will be completely removed and the non-tariff barriers will be reduced for trade facilitation. These liberalizations of trade in goods and services would generate economic gains to the participating countries. It should be noted that TPP is expected to liberalize not only trade in goods and services but also investment and movement of labour, but our analysis is confined to the former due to the data limitation.

Despite employing a recently updated data base and constructing more realistic scenarios, this chapter provides relatively similar results to previous researches, confirming that Viet Nam will gain most in the TPP bloc in terms of the real GDP and economic welfare (in percentage change). In all three scenarios, Viet Nam is the economy experiencing the greatest percentage change in the real GDP, ranging from 1.03% to 2.11% increase, resulted mostly from the rise in investment and consumption. However, in absolute term, these figures can be translated into the gains of 1.4 - 2.9 billion USD, relatively low compared to the ones of Japan and Canada (in all scenarios) and also the US (in the two scenarios with service trade facilitation). Regarding investment, the gain for Viet Nam is the most outstanding among member countries, approximate to Japan and almost double Australia, Malaysia and the US (in scenarios without spillover effect of trade facilitation to non-TPP economies). In terms of trade, while exports observe a minor decrease, imports surge, resulting in a larger trade deficit for Viet Nam. Concerning the sectoral change thanks to the TPP, we observe an adjustment in Viet Nam's production and labour away from industries with eroding comparative advantage (such as agricultural sectors) and towards the comparatively advantaged ones (especially Apparel, Leather Manufacturing and Utility Services & Construction).

Based on the above findings, we would like to give the following policy implications:

First, this study again confirms the need of institutional reforms and liberalization of primary inputs such as labour, capital and land. Integration without those reforms will not only hinder Viet Nam from taking advantage of the opportunities, but also create negative impacts on its economic growth.

Second, once TPP is implemented, resulting in reduction in tax revenue, the government can try to offset the budget deficit by other sources. However, policies to improve the balance of payments need to be put into thorough consideration to achieve the macroeconomic stability, promote production and consumption, and avoid conflicts with other policies.

Third, Viet Nam needs to implement policies to foster sectoral restructuring in order to enhance the productivity. Besides, reasonable supports should be directed to industries with comparative advantage to improve competitiveness of domestic products and encourage exports, advancing Viet Nam's position in global value chains.

Fourth, FTAs nowadays do not only require the tariff removal but also concern about the non-tariff barriers such as transportation costs and customs procedures. Especially, on participating in TPP, Viet Nam also needs to adjust non-trade issues such as labour, intellectual property rights, etc. Therefore, the implementation of TPP commitments requires reforms in domestic policies and legal system.

Fifth, it is necessary to promote research, training, and implementation of suitable technical barriers in order protect domestic producers in line with supporting Vietnamese exporters in satisfying the demand of trade partners.

Finally, thanks to TPP, Viet Nam's investment (including domestic and foreign investment) will increase significantly. This is an opportunity and a challenge at the same time in attracting and utilizing the FDI inflows. Therefore, Viet Nam needs to implement administrative reforms, effective investment policies and accelerate the development of supporting industries to benefit from the TPP.

TOWARD THE SUSTAINABLE INTEGRATION OF VIETNAM'S RICE MARKET: A MARKET STRUCTURE APPROACH

Since late 1980s, Vietnamese rice sector has remained oriented toward increasing rice production and export, which has helped Viet Nam not only ensure domestic food security but also become one of the three biggest rice exporters in the world in the last decades. However, along with structural transformations in the international rice market, this orientation seems to mislead Vietnamese rice sector to many potential risks, such as low rice export prices with the continuing instability, putting the domestic rice market under the pressure of reducing prices; increasingly deteriorating soil quality; stagnant farmer households' welfare. These will surely challenge the sector's sustainable development. It is therefore high time for Viet Nam to

determine precisely the major orientation of the rice sector to be readily adaptable to the world rice market characteristics, and implement reforms based on market stakeholders' performance toward the sustainable development of Viet Nam's rice market.

Chapter 6 applies Structure-Conduct-Performance (SCP) Framework of the industry organization theory to identify major Vietnamese and world's rice market characteristics. In the framework of SCP, market structure will define the stakeholders' conduct, and the stakeholders' conduct will determine their performance in the market. In addition, other factors such as market entrance barriers, the speed of the demand growth, and investment costs also affect the power and performance of the market stakeholders.

The analysis of the international rice market structure indicates that in the long-term, the rice export supply will be likely to surpass the demand. The reason is that while many countries importing rice like the Philippines and Indonesia endeavor to implement self-sufficiency strategies, countries like India, Cambodia and Myanmar with their own export potential are accelerating rice production. Furthermore, rice consumption in Asian countries is expected to peak in 2030, then remain unchanged or decrease slightly. Therefore, Viet Nam's rice sector should transfer its orientation into strongly developing domestic rice market. The domestic market ought to perform an important role in building and testing quality standards, band name as well as place of origin of the rice grains produced in Viet Nam.

After identifying the market structure, conduct and performance, we note the natural development potential of the milling firms which could accumulate the capital, establish vertical linkages to become enterprises with specialized rice producing zones, modern processing facilities and stable output market. These millers are encouraged to abide by GMP-RM and be self-responsible for using rice separators based on world standard of rice separation process. Furthermore, to develop domestic rice market, we recommend abolishing VAT on domestic rice consumption to achieve the equality between domestic wholesalers and exporters; add the irrigation system depreciation to the rice prices, especially the export rice prices.

Regards to the segment of trading paddy rice, to improve the farmer's efficiency and power, we analyzed and figured out the need for developing the adequate microfinance and insurance system for farmers; easing the harvest area limit for each household, which would encourage the land accumulation for farmers to cultivate in large-scale areas. The research also suggests the government implement more flexible policies towards the reserved 3.8 million hectares for rice cultivation, widening the opportunities for farmers to use the land more effectively. As for the segment of trading rice, for enhancing the market efficiency, the conditions on rice exporters need to be eased. Besides, VFA should be reformed toward assuring the participation and the voice of the representatives of private enterprises, local authorities and farmers in the association. Based on changes in world's rice market, the

decision of VFA must be prompt enough to ensure firms' and farmers' interests. VINAFOOD I and II ought to focus solely on implementing policies (such as to co-ordinate and supervise the rice purchasing for the food security storage policy), while diminish their share of commercial distribution towards giving all of this playing ground for private companies.

VIET NAM ECONOMIC PROSPECTS 2015 AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS

In addition to medium-term policies that taking into account policy implications suggested within each chapter of the Report, chapter 7 presents two forecasts on Vietnam's macroeconomic prospects in 2015 and a comprehensive discussion on short-term policies adopted at the moment.

The year 2015 will be a remarkable year as it marks a number of milestones in Viet Nam's integration process since the accession to WTO in late 2007. The highlights include: signing of the EU – Viet Nam Free Trade Agreements (EU – VN FTA), basic conclusion of the TPP negotiation rounds, and the ASEAN Economic Community (AEC) coming into effect. The Viet Nam's highpoints of integration will make broad impacts on the Vietnamese economy in the medium and long terms.

Regarding the internal economy, there are two major issues in 2015. *First,* budget deficit is rising due to difficulties in maintaining and improving revenue, coupled with weak efforts in cutting expenditures. This exposes the Government to difficulties in mobilizing fund to finance the deficit. If the National Assembly cannot reach to an agreement about raising the quantity of bonds or public debt ceiling, the Government may be driven to find temporary fund from the State Bank of Viet Nam in a number of ways, though they are in the domain of monetary measures rather than fiscal measures. In that case, it leads to a risk of breaking the restraints of the monetary and fiscal discipline, which will create a dangerous precedent. The immediate impact of these choices is the deterioration of market confidence on the monetary policy and the transparency of fiscal policies. Second, the exchange rate of VND/USD has been kept stable in nominal term, from which the real appreciation of VND accrued. This trend has stealthily deteriorated the competitiveness of domestically-made products as well as services, such as tourism.

It is important to note that, these two issued appears to be unrelated but turns out to be strongly correlated with each other, especially in case of adverse shocks. For example, if financing budget deficit triggers a moderate increase in inflation in 2016, it could raise the depreciating pressure. Moreover, if the depreciation is too small, it will probably create a cycle of inflation – depreciation that would break the current macro balances.

The two scenarios show that the annual economic growth in 2015 will maintain the momentum accrued since 2013. Against the backdrop of temporary stability, the two scenarios relatively converge. The low scenario forecasts the economic growth at 6.1% while the higher forecasts an annual growth of 6.3% (2010 prices). The end-of-year inflation rate is expected to be low at 1,9% in the former scenarios while in the latter scenario, heightened economic activities may drive inflation to 3.2% as inflation will accelerate during the second half of 2015 and 2016. This is the case of a new cycle of inflation – depreciation mentioned above. The second scenario looked not different from the first scenario, but it implies a significantly higher degree of risks that may be presented in 2016.

Regarding fundamental issues of the economy, it is important to note that

□Given the vulnerability of the banking system, banks may not withstand extreme but plausible shocks. It remains uncertain about the financial soundness of each bank (information asymmetry); Besides,

□Orientating production and export industries needs to be more marketized to enhance the competitiveness and the strength of enterprises. Take rice production industry for example, it is recommended to ease the condition for exporters, increase the role of endogenous factor (miller enterprises) to create a foundation for intra-industry vertical integration and form the competitiveness of the industry

□Viet Nam's benefit from joining TPP is going to be positive and fundamental, which will impact on the economic structure through multiple of channels of effects in industries and areas. The benefit will be greater if the endowments such as capital, labour and land are flexible to move. This correlates strongly with administrative and institutional reforms.

Based on those issues, a number of related policies are highlighted:

□Flexible monetary policy to realign the VND; maintain or build up forex reserves to

strengthen the confidence in monetary policy.

Carry on reforms and restructure of the banking system to create a premise for the
recovery of profit margin and recapitalization of the banking system. Restructure high-risk
portfolios.
□ Apply technical barriers to trade for imported goods and raise awareness about technical barriers erected by export markets
\Box Strongly reform the internal institutions to enhance the flexibility of endowments which will facilitate cross-border movements
□Nevertheless, the long-term issues are raising productivity and added value. They
requires simultaneous reforms in administration, institution and schemes in each enterprises to
increase its productivity and efficiency.

Beside the medium and long-term policy recommendations mentioned above and policy discussions in great detail in each chapter of the Report, Chapter 7 proposes another integration initiative. In order to be more involved in the integration process, as well as to reap more benefit from the freedom of navigation and marine security, we recommend Viet Nam to proposal for an establishment of the Pan–Asia Marine Economic Cooperation – PAMEC). This organization should aim to build a hi-quality marine infrastructure, connecting most significant marine economies between the Indian Ocean and the Pacific Ocean, establishing a united bloc for common prosperity and security. PAMEC can be built on the basis of these potential founding member candidates (alphabetical order): Australia, Canada, China, Japan, India, Indonesia, New Zealand, Malaysia, Myanmar, Philippines, Singapore, Sri Lanka, Taiwan, Thailand, Vietnam, and the United States.











Vietnam Annual Economic Report 2015

INTEGRATION OPPORTUNITIES, INTEGRATION CHALLENGES

Ha Noi, May 28, 2015

Copyright © VEPR 2015

1



Good Policy, Sound Economy


Copyright © VEPR 2015

2



- A number of progressive reforms were enacted in 2014. Their impacts, however, will depend on the instructions from the central authority and the implementation of the local authorities.
- A number of free-trade agreements were in the final rounds of negotiation, raising the question on whether Viet Nam is ready to take a further step in its integration into the regional and global economy.
- Recent fluctuations of the global economy have shown that geo-political instabilities can lay a strong impact on the oil price and global trade, causing unexpected negative shocks which can affect to the budget and other macroeconomic balances.
- The government continued to deliver strong messages for institutional reforms in order to further integrate into the global economy, improve the quality of growth, and raise the country's competitiveness. Nevertheless, there are still many constraints in the implementation process.

Copyright © VEPR 2015



VEPR Contents

Good Policy, Sound Economy

- Chapter 1: Overview of the World Economy 2014
- Chapter 2: Overview of the Vietnamese Economy in 2014
- Chapter 3: The instability behind the stability of the nominal exchange rate
- Chapter 4: Macroprudential Analysis for Viet Nam's Banking Sector 2015 An Application of Stress Testing
- Chapter 5: Gains and Losses from the TPP: An Assessment for Viet Nam using GTAP Model
- Chapter 6: Toward the Sustainable Integration of Viet Nam's Rice Market:

 A Market Structure Approach
- Chapter 7: Vietnam's Economic Prospects 2015 and Policy Implications
- Appendix 1: Statistics on Vietnamese Economy
- Appendix 2: Economic Policy in 2014

4





- 1. Pham Van Dai, MA
- 2. Nguyen Thi Thu Hang, PhD
- 3. Ken Itakura. Prof.
- 4. Vu Minh Long
- 5. Dinh Tuan Minh
- 6. Nguyen Thi Linh Nga
- 7. Nguyen Cam Nhung, PhD

- 8. Le Kim Sa, PhD
- 9. Nguyen Quang Thai
- 10. Ngo Quoc Thai
- 11. Nguyen Duc Thanh, PhD
- 12. Hoang Thi Chinh Thon
- 13. Nguyen Thanh Tung


5

VEPR Advisory Board

Good Policy, Sound Economy

Nguyen Dinh Cung, PhD
Le Dang Doanh, PhD
Le Hong Giang, PhD
Huynh The Du, PhD
Nguyen Huu Duc, Prof. PhD
Luu Bich Ho, PhD
Tran Viet Ky, PhD
Pham Chi Lan, Mrs.
Le Bo Linh, A.Prof. PhD
Vo Dai Luoc, Prof, DrSc.

Le Xuan Nghia, PhD
Vu Viet Ngoan, PhD
Phung Xuan Nha, A.Prof. PhD
Le Hong Nhat, PhD
Nguyen Hong Son, A.Prof. PhD
Nguyen Quang Thai, Prof, Dr.Sc.
Vo Tri Thanh, PhD
Le Le Thuy, PhD
Truong Dinh Tuyen, Mr.
Dinh Quang Ty, PhD



VEPR Contents

Good Policy, Sound Economy

- > The world economic growth shifted to a "new normal"
- > Global unemployment remained high
- > Global trade remained sluggish
- > Almost no progress in trade negotiations
- Global capital flows reduced slightly
- > Sharp fall in input prices
- Loose monetary policy and flexible fiscal policy in the main economies
- > Prospects for 2015 and beyond
- Implications for Viet Nam

Copyright © VEPR 2015



The worst impacts of the global financial crisis faded away. The world economy moved to a "new normal" stage, with lower growth rate than the pre-crisis level.

Table 1.1. Economic growth, 2012-2014 (%)

			(/	<u> </u>			
		IMF			WB		
	2012	2013	2014	2012	2013	2014	
World	3.2	3.0	3.3	2.5	2.4	2.6	
Developed economies	1.4	1.3	1.8	1.5	1.3	1.8	
US	2.8	1.9	2.4	2.8	1.8	2.4	
Japan	1.4	1.5	0.1	2.0	1.7	0.2	
Europe	-0.7	-0.5	8.0	-0.6	-0.4	8.0	
Germany	0.9	0.5	1.5	0.7	n.a	n.a	
France	0.0	0.3	0.4	0.0	n.a	n.a	
Spain	-1.6	-1.2	1.4	-1.6	n.a	n.a	
Italia	-2.4	-1.9	-0.4	-2.0	n.a	n.a	
Emerging economies	5.0	4.7	4.4	4.8	4.8	4.5	
China	7.7	7.7	7.4	7.7	7.7	7.4	
India	4.7	4.4	5.8	5.0	4.8	5.6	
ASEAN-5	6.2	5.2	4.5	n.a	n.a	n.a	
Russia	3.4	1.3	0.6	3.4	1.3	0.7	
Brazil	1.0	2.3	0.1	0.9	2.2	0.1	

Note: ASEAN-5 includes Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Thailand, Vietnam Copyright © VEPR 2015 Source: IMF(10/2013, 4/2014, 1/2015), WB (2014, 2015)

9



- Growth rate of the world economy was 3.3% (IMF, 2015), slightly higher than that of 2012 and 2013 but remarkably lower than earlier forecasts by international institutions
- Reasons for low growth rate:
- Growth rates were uneven among major economies. The US economy grew faster but could not offset the slower growth in China and Brazil; prolonged low growth in Europe and Japan.
- Reduced global trade and investment.
- There were several incidents, such as Ebola epidemic outbreak in Africa and the sharp decline in oil prices starting mid-2014, in line with geo-political tensions such as escalated political tension between Russia, Ukraine and the West, the territorial disputes on the East Sea and the fight against IS in the Middle East.



- In the US, after a decline of 2.1% in the first quarter due to the severe consequences of a harsh winter, the US economy gained a spectacular growth in the 2nd and 3rd quarter, respectively reached 4.2% and 3.5%, leading to the economic growth rate of 2.4% in 2014. The improvement in labor market enabled consumption and strengthened consumer confidence and business indices.
- EU: the recession and deflation ware over but growth remained weak and the decline in oil prices in the second half of 2014 brought back the threat of deflation in Europe.
- The policies adopted in EU over the past 5 years since the debt crisis proved to be ineffective. The geopolitical tensions between Russia and the West leading to an economic sanction also contributed to the low growth.



- Japan: the consumption tax hike from 5% to 8% coming into effect on Apr 1st, 2014 pushed the Japanese economy from a strong growth in the first quarter of 2014 to a recession in the two following quarters, resulting in the Japanese economy growth of nearly 0%.
- China: growth continued to decline from 7.7% in 2013 to 7.4% in 2014, its lowest level since 2009. China started to reform in recent years, towards transforming the economy from exports-based to domestic consumption-based.
- ASEAN: economic growth continued to fall for the second year in a row, reaching at 4.6% in 2014. Thailand had the lowest growth of 0.7%. Thailand's prolonged political crisis continued to impact negatively on its domestic demand and consumer confidence.



• Given the low rate of the world economy, the aggregate demand of the key economies remained weak and the austerity policy in the eurozone continued to make labor markets bleak. The global unemployment was 201.3 million, 1.2 million higher than in 2013 (ILO, 2015).

Table 1.2. The world labor market, 2010-2014	Table 1.2.	The world	labor market.	2010-2014
--	-------------------	-----------	---------------	-----------

	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014
Labor participate rate (%)	63.4	63.4	63.4	63.5	65.3
Employment growth (%)	1.2	1.4	1.4	1.3	-
Unemployment rate (%)					
Global unemployment	6.1	6.0	6.0	6.0	5.9
Youth unemployment rate	12.9	12.8	12.9	13	13
Unemployment (mil. pers.)					
Global unemployment	196.63	195.45	197.6	200.13	201.3
Youth unemployment	75.44	74.13	74	73.74	73.67
ht © VEPR 2015	Source: ILO (2015)				13



- Number of unemployed youth fell slightly from 73.74 million (in 2013) to 73.67 million people (in 2014) and equivalent to 13%, nearly three times the rate of adult labor. Youth unemployment continued to create pressure on human resources in the medium term in developed economies.
- Notably, youth unemployment has remained high since the crisis although there have been efforts to improve level of education for the young labor force. This is an alarming situation because if the cyclical unemployment continued to prolong, which might cause a gradual loss of skills and contribute to structural unemployment.





The global unemployment remained high

- Unemployment rate in EU reduced slightly but remained at the high level of 11.4%. Greece had the highest unemployment rate of 26.4%
- Unemployment rate in the US declined to 6.2%. Employment grew dramatically in services, drinks, retails, restaurants, health care and construction, reflecting the growth of services sector.

Table 1.3. Unemployment in several countries and OECD, 2012-2014 (%)

2012 2013 2014 2015 OECD 8 7.8 7.3 7 US 8.1 7.5 6.2 5.6 EU 11.3 12 11.4 11.1 France - 10.4 10.9 10 Germany - 5.3 5 4.7 Italia - 12.2 12.5 12.6 Japan 4.3 4 3.6 3.5					
US 8.1 7.5 6.2 5.6 EU 11.3 12 11.4 11.1 France - 10.4 10.9 10 Germany - 5.3 5 4.7 Italia - 12.2 12.5 12.6		2012	2013	2014	2015*
EU 11.3 12 11.4 11.1 France - 10.4 10.9 10 Germany - 5.3 5 4.7 Italia - 12.2 12.5 12.6	OECD	8	7.8	7.3	7
France - 10.4 10.9 10 Germany - 5.3 5 4.7 Italia - 12.2 12.5 12.6	US	8.1	7.5	6.2	5.6
Germany - 5.3 5 4.7 Italia - 12.2 12.5 12.6	EU	11.3	12	11.4	11.1
Italia - 12.2 12.5 12.6	France	-	10.4	10.9	10
	Germany	-	5.3	5	4.7
Japan 4.3 4 3.6 3.5	Italia	-	12.2	12.5	12.6
	Japan	4.3	4	3.6	3.5

Source: OECD (2015), ILO(2015)

Copyright © VEPR 2015

15



Good Policy, Sound Economy

Global trade remained sluggish

- Global trade growth declined slightly 2014 to 3.4%.
- Reasons: i) weak aggregate demand from the major economies; ii) the fall of oil prices and commodities; iii) rising trade barriers in G20 countries; iv) the decreasingly segmented production network of global value chains led to a decrease in global trade and reduced the trade elasticity to incomes; and v) retaliating economic sanction between Russia, the West and the US.

Table 1.4. Global trade growth in goods and services, 2011-2014 (%)

	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015*
Global trade volume	6.2	2.8	3.5	3.4	3.7
Exports					
Developed economies	6.3	2	3.1	3.3	3.2
Emerging economies	7.4	4.4	4.6	3.4	5.3
Imports					
Developed economies	5.5	0.9	2.1	3.3	3.3
Emerging economies	9.8	6	5.5	3.7	3.5

Source: IMF (2014)

16



VEPR Global trade remained sluggish

- The appreciation of the USD in 2014 contributed to the increased US trade deficit. Germany replaced China to have the biggest trade surplus, which reached 7.5% of GDP in 2014.
- Although the US deficit increased slightly, the world current account gap did not change due to a decline in the surplus in a number of economies having large surplus such as China, Japan and oil-exporting countries.

Table 1.5. Balance	of curre	ent acc	count,	2011-	2014
	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015*
% GDP					
World	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.4
US	-2.9	-2.7	-2.3	-2.4	-2.3
Japan	2	1	0.7	0.5	1.9
EU	8.0	2	2.9	2.3	3.3
Germany	6.1	7.1	6.7	7.5	8.4
China	1.9	2.3	2.1	2	3.2
Oil-exporting countries	11.5	10.4	7.4	6.5	-1
\$ billion					
World	371	342	374.5	366.9	300.2
US	-458	-440	-379	-400.3	-410.2
Japan	119	60	33.6	24.3	81.6
EU	109	246	284.3	313	388.3
Germany	228.1	252.3	251.3	287.5	286.8
China	136	215.4	182.8	209.8	356.3
Oil-exporting countries	636	608	445	332	-9.5

Source: IMF (2015)

Copyright © VEPR 2015

17



Good Policy, Sound Economy


Trade negotiations could not conclude

- Trade negotiations continued in 2014, which include the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP), the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) and Trade Partnership Agreements and Investment transatlantic (TTIP).
 - + TPP aims to utilize and make the most of the US's advantages. This agreement promotes further economic liberalization, which includes provisions on the protection of workers, public enterprise reform, environmental standards, strict protection of intellectual property rights, elimination of tariffs, without any exclusion for sensitive sectors.
 - + RCEP becomes more attractive for a number of developing economies because RCEP allows different levels of development with more flexible treatment.




- As the world economic growth remained modest and fragile, the conflicts and geopolitical instability prevented the flow of foreign investment, especially from the developed countries. It mitigated the flow of global FDI by about 8% to \$1.26 trillion.
- FDI to the developed countries reduced by 14% to about \$511 billion, especially the capital flows to the US declined to \$86 billion, about a third of that in 2013.





FDI in groups, 2012-2014




Source: UNCTAD 2015

19

Good Policy, Sound Economy VEPR Global capital flow reduced slightly

- In developing countries, inflow of FDI made a new record with more than \$700 billion, about 4% rise compared to 2013, and accounted for 56% of global FDI inflows. With capital flows into both the financial and non-financial sectors reaching about \$128 billion, China became the largest FDI recipient in the world.
- Transnational M&A continued to recover, increasing by 19% to \$384 billion, most of which occurred in the financial sector, pharmaceuticals and telecommunications. In 2014, numerous large deals were made. There were 222 M&A deals worth over \$ 1 billion, up 32% compared to 2013.
- The TNCs gradually regained confidence and expanded investment, which increased the value of new deals by about 3% in 2014.

Top 10 FDI recipients in 2014




Source: UNCTAD, 2015.

20




 Due political factor between Russia, the US and Western Europe as well as by increased competition for market share, oil supply faced a serious imbalance which made oil prices fall continuously from \$111.8/barrel in mid-June 2014 to \$47.76/barrel in January 2015.





- Commodity prices simultaneously fell in 2014. Commodity prices have fallen by 28% in 2014, in which energy prices decreased by 38%. Prices of non-energy commodities dropped. Metal prices fell by 15% and prices of agricultural products declined by 6%.
- Food prices also decreased 7% in 9/2014, with an exception of fish.



Good Policy, Sound Economy

Source: FAO 2015





Continued loose monetary policy

- As inflation fell below the 2% target in most major economies, the central banks decided to maintain low interest rates in 2014. The Federal Reserve has decided to end QE3 in May 10th, 2014 and maintained the interest rate at 0-0.25%. The Fed may raise the base rate in 2015
- The European Central Bank had to lower deposit rates to negative 0.2% from May 6th, 2014 to redirect the flow of loans to businesses and consumers, and also lowered the refinancing rate to 0.05% in order to encourage companies to borrow, expand and create more jobs in Europe.
- The Bank of Japan kept the interest rate under 0.1% which was applied since 2009. On Oct 30th, 2014, the BoJ announced an additional annual injection of 30 trillion Yen to the economy through the expansion of its quantitative easing programme. The supply of money was raised to 80 trillion Yen/year.
- People's Bank of China pumped 769.5 billion yuan (\$126 billion) into the banking system to refinance banks. In November 2014, PBoC cut the base rate for the first time in over two years to support the economy. The benchmark lending interest rate was reduced from 6% to 5.6% and the interest rate of 1-year deposit also was cut from 3% to 2.75%.

Copyright © VEPR 2015



Good Policy, Sound Economy

Flexible fiscal policies

- Global budget deficit increased slightly in 2014 compared to 2013 and reached 3.3% of GDP.
- The fiscal situation improved in the US as the deficit fell to \$483.3 billion (equivalent to 5.3% of GDP), down sharply from \$680.2 billion in 2013.
- Japan: increased revenues from consumption tax contributed approximately \$48 billion to the budget to help reduce the budget deficit to 7.7% of GDP, although this remained the highest level among developed countries.

Table 1.6. Budget deficit in several economies, 2009–2014 (% of GDP)

	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014
World	-7.3	-5.9	-4.3	-3.9	-3.2	-3.3
Europe	-6.2	-6.1	-4.1	-3.6	-2.9	-2.7
France	-7.2	-6.8	-5.1	-4.9	-4.1	-4.2
Spain	-11.1	-9.4	-9.4	-10.3	-6.8	-5.8
Germany	-3.1	-4	-0.8	-0.1	0.0	0.6
Italia	-5.4	-4.4	-3.7	-2.9	-3.0	-3.0
Greece	-15.6	-10.8	-9.6	-6.3	-2.8	-2.7
Russia	-5.5	-3	1.6	0.2	-1.5	0
UK	-11.3	-10.0	-7.8	-8.0	-5.8	-5.7
Japan	-10.4	-9.3	-9.8	-8.7	-8.4	-7.7
US	-13.5	-11.3	-9.9	-8.6	-5.8	-5.3
China	-1.8	-1.2	0.6	0	-1.1	-1.1
India	-9.8	-8.4	-8.1	-7.5	-7.2	-7.1

Source: IMF Fiscal Monitor (4/2015)

24





Flexible fiscal policies

- Japan deferred the 2nd phase of consumption tax hike (from 8% to 10%) to May 4th 2017 as the economy could not stand the shock from the first phase of consumption tax increase.
- US: income tax is expected to increase to a maximum of 28% for high-income families
- EU: budget deficit is contained at below 3% of GDP, but the European sovereign debt continued to increase during the last six years and reached 94% of GDP in 2014. France, Spain, and Italy still had high budget deficit and failed to meet the provisions of the EU.

Table 1.7. Government debt in several countries, 2009–2014 (% GDP)

	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014
World	75.4	77.7	78.7	80.5	79.1	79.8
Europe	78.4	83.9	86.5	91.1	93.4	94
France	78.8	81.5	85	89.2	92.4	95.1
Spain	52.7	60.1	69.2	84.4	92.1	97.7
Germany	72.4	80.3	77.6	79.0	76.9	73.1
Italia	112.5	115.3	116.4	123.2	128.6	132.1
Greece	126.2	145.7	171	156.5	174.9	177.2
Russia	10.6	11.3	11.6	12.7	14	17.9
UK	65.8	76.4	81.8	85.8	87.3	89.5
Japan	210.2	216	229.8	236.8	242.6	246.4
US	86.1	94.8	99.0	102.4	103.4	104.8
China	35.8	36.6	36.5	37.3	39.4	41.1
India	72.5	67.5	68.1	67.5	65.5	65_

Source: IMF Fiscal Monitor (4/2015)

Copyright © VEPR 2015

25



Good Policy, Sound Economy

- EU: a number of countries have made fiscal adjustments to overcome the current debt crisis.
 - France: Increased corporate income tax on February 2014 by about 5% to 10.7% from the current level and expected to be in effect in two years (the European Commission (2014).
 - Italy: cut public spending and reduced taxes for low-income people through a package of tax cuts for 10 million low-income people from 8000-26000 Euro/year. VAT increased in food and beverage dispensing machines sold at vending from 4% to 10%.
 - Spain: postponed salary increases in the public sector and reduces spending in education and health.
 - Greece: personal income tax are adjusted from Jan 1st, 2014, the income of farmers is treated as the income of the household business and taxed at a fixed rate of 13%, without being exempted for income under 5000 Euro as before.



VEPR Prospects for 2015 and beyond

- In 2015, the world economic growth is expected to slightly increase compared to 2014, with the expectations of the US, Germany and the UK economies being the main drivers of growth. Underneath the economic recovery, there exist mixed trends affecting global growth.
- China will continue to experience a slow-down in growth during its reform path.
- The Russian economy will continue to suffer the sanctions imposed by the West related to the crisis in Ukraine as well as the impact of lower oil prices and the capital flight.
- The enhanced quantitative easing will cause the Yen continue to depreciate in 2015, facilitating the exports of Japan. The economy of EU and Japan are expected to grow, albeit slowly.
- The US plans to increase the base rate in June 2015. This trend is likely to cause volatility on exchange markets and the world financial markets, and impact on countries with foreign debt denominated by USD.

Copyright © VEPR 2015



- The world trade will remain bleak due to weak aggregate demand. The RCEP and TPP negotiations are expected to be concluded in 2015. The AEC will be established by the end of 2015 with an expectation of facilitating greater intra-ASEAN trade and investment.
- Although the US oil production has decreased significantly but oil supplies worldwide are growing faster than demand. On the other hand, due to the pressure on geopolitical issues, oil prices in 2015 will not decrease but unlikely to rise sharply. Food prices may fall due to further improvement of supply of the main food products. Price of cereals and major vegetable are expected to drop sharply, especially for wheat and soybeans due to lower fuel costs and an improvement in agricultural production.
- Global FDI flows will also have many obstacles including weak aggregate demand and fragile growth, falling commodity prices, weak trade. Global FDI may decline slightly in 2015 (UNCTAD, 2015).



Good Policy, Sound Economy

Prospects for 2015 and beyond

There is not many positive signs in international trade, global capital flows as well as mixed trend in potential growth, the global economy in 2015 is forecasted at moderate, around 3.5% according to the IMF forecast (2015) and 3% of the World Bank (2015).

Table 1.8. Forecast of the world economic growth 2015

% GDP	IMF	WB	UN	ADB
World	3.5	3.0	3.1	n.a
Developed economies	2.4	2.2	2.1	n.a
US	3.1	3.2	2.8	3.2
Japan	1.0	1.2	1.2	1.1
Europe	1.5	1.1	1.3	1.1
Emerging economies	4.3	4.8	4.8	n.a
China	6.8	7.1	7.0	7.2
India	7.5	6.4	5.9	7.8
ASEAN-5	5.2	n.a	n.a	n.a
Russia	-3.8	-2.9	0.2	n.a
Brazil	-1.0	1.0	1.5	n.a

Copyright © VEPR 2015 Source: IMF, WB, ADB and UN (2015)

29



Good Policy, Sound Economy

EPR Implications to Viet Nam

- First, the US is expected to tighten monetary policy by interest rate instruments in June 2015. That may cause certain pressure on the exchange rates for many countries, including Vietnam where a stronger dollar would require the exchange rate policy to be more flexible. For foreign debt, if the US dollar appreciate sharply in the coming period, the dollar-debt may have to bear a higher cost.
- China's growth slowed in a more sustainable way which will help it maintain inflation at a low level so the countries depending on exports from China, such as Viet Nam will also benefit from low costs. However, the quality of products imported from China should be subject to tighter control.



EPR Implications to Viet Nam

- The oil price in the future will gradually increase slightly due to world supply which has narrowed following the peak seen in early 2014. With this trend, the transportation from individuals and households to businesses will no longer benefit from the reduction in oil price seen in 2014. As both a producer and consumer of gasoline, so Viet Nam's state budget revenues from the export of crude oil will be improved. But as the price of petroleum products will tend to rise, the rising cost of production could cause pressure on the consumer price index in 2015.
- As economic forecasts for the US, Europe and Japan, the largest trade partners of Viet Nam, will be more optimistic in 2015, the coming year may be more favorable for the export of goods from Viet Nam. However, Viet Nam's enterprises still need to continue to improve the quality of their products to meet the demand in these strict markets with their system of technical barriers to trade.


Copyright © VEPR 2015



Good Policy, Sound Economy

PR Implications to Viet Nam


- Global M & A will continue to grow especially in the financial sector and made by TNCs of the group of developed economies and emerging economies. Vietnam needs to continue to improve the investment environment to become more competitive in embracing this trend.
- As the growth of the global economy in next stage depends on the applicability and commercialization of scientific and technological achievements, Vietnam should change the traditional growth model, further effectively exploit the growth model based on comparative advantage, and create a foundation for transition to a new growth model, based on economies of scale, technology and innovation.
- Global economic growth is still based on the promotion of trade liberalization. Therefore, Vietnam continues to deeper integration into the global economy, creating external pressure to reform inside and get more favorable conditions as call for the resources to serve development goals.








Good Policy, Sound Economy


- > Introduction
- > Economic growth and inflation
- Aggregate supply
- > Aggregate demand
- Macroeconomic balances
- > Capital market and money market
- Property markets























- The number of firms halting operation and dissolved reached the peak in 4 years (2011-14), of which over-3-year-old firms were the majority.
- Small and micro firms accounted for a major percentage
- Continuous losses, unable to access to capital
- Inventory rose, albeit slowing during the second half
- Restrained consumption





Good Policy, Sound Economy


43


- Growth at a 10-year low
- Services imports 14.5 USD, + 22% yoy
- While exports only 11 billion USD, +4% yoy
- Imports rose the most in logistic and marine insurance





























- Focus on core activities
- No merger or acquisition
- Improved financial capacity (contracted net interest margin)
- Bank of Construction failed
- Non-performing loans may have decreased but still be unsound (>>3%)
- Uncertainty about actual financial soundness
- SMEs difficult to access loans
- NPLs disposal faced obstacles in resolving collaterals attached to land


55

Copyright © VEPR 2015



- Outstanding credit rose by 14%
- Foreign currency credit rose 2 to 3-fold compared to domestic currency
- Lower interest rate and low risk of exchange rate
- Dollarization rose
- Loan/Deposit in forex 88%, VND 80%
- Could pressurize the balance of the money market








- As economic growth is constrained partly by institutional factors, institutional reforms and setting up sound macro environment remain highest priority in coming period.
- Risks and macroeconomic imbalances can accumulate in the highgrowth phase but can be easily overlooked. High growth is unsustainable due to the economic cycle and sticky structure.
- Because benefits from lower oil prices will only be realized more clearly in the medium term, the government would be more tempted to raise taxes or create inflation. Negative impacts created by increased taxes or inflation could damage outlook and slow down economic recovery.



Good Policy, Sound Economy

- The SBV should be prudent with foreign currency-denominated credit. Promoting foreign currency-denominated credit can ease the burden of the banking system in terms of credit growth, yet it seems to conflict with the goal of reducing the rate of dollarization in the Vietnamese financial system.
- Remittances are masking the deficit in trade that tends to depreciate the VND.
- The expected impact of the appreciation of real exchange rate on the Vietnamese exported goods urges the reconsideration of exchange rate policy. The narrow adjustments as seen in the past three years are considered too cautious and weakening domestic firms.





- The collapse of the Bretton Woods system in 1970s => governments have been more active in exchange rate management.
- Most countries attempt to obtain an appropriate exchange rate rather than leaving it to the market force.
- However, there was a series of currency crises: East Asia (1997-98), Russia (1997-99), Mexico (1995), Argentina (1998-2000).
- => To determine an appropriate level of exchange rate is not an easy question.



- Washington consensus (WB, IMF): exchange rate should be at equilibrium level, avoiding undervaluation and overvaluation.
- Mercantilist: undervaluation to support exports and economic growth

✓ Positive: China

✓ Negative: High inflation in Latin America

⇒ Unanimous: Avoiding overvaluation Under debate: an equilibrium or undervalued exchange rate


Copyright © VEPR 2015





- Small international reserve
- High openness
- Exchange rate instability + less financial development
 high inflation and low efficiency of the economy.
- A less developed welfare system => vulnerable lowincome classes
- => Importance of the exchange rate issue




- Purchasing power parity (PPP) approach:
 - √ Real effective exchange rate(REER) and bilateral real exchange rate (RER)
 - ✓ Advantages: simple
 - ✓ Disadvantages: The equilibrium level of exchange rate is constant => not realistic
- ⇒ An effective tool to discuss the short-run movement of the exchange rate, but not appropriate for long-term analysis.











- General equilibrium approach
 - Simulating an general equilibrium model or estimating a reduced equation.
 - Advantages: a comprehensive theoretical framework.
 - Disadvantages: Complication and there is no unique empirical framework.
- => The best tool to calculate equilibrium exchange rate in developing countries



	Viet	Nam	Ch	ina	Thai	land	Mala	ysia	Philli	pines Indonesia		nesia
	MIS1	MIS2	MIS1	MIS2	MIS1	MIS2	MIS1	MIS2	MIS1	MIS2	MIS1	MIS2
1996	0.87	0.79	0.82	0.86	1.06	1.23	1.08	1.02	1.09	1.20	1.07	0.86
1997	0.92	0.84	0.91	0.92	1.00	1.21	1.05	0.99	1.11	1.22	1.00	0.81
1998	1.08	0.93	1.10	1.05	1.00	1.26	1.03	0.98	1.04	1.10	0.70	0.60
1999	1.11	1.01	0.98	0.93	0.99	1.17	1.00	1.00	1.10	1.20	0.83	0.67
2000	1.05	1.02	1.04	0.98	0.99	1.09	1.01	1.00	1.04	1.08	0.86	0.81
2001	1.02	1.01	1.08	1.02	0.94	1.06	1.12	1.12	1.01	0.99	0.81	0.77
2002	0.98	0.98	1.05	0.99	0.98	1.11	1.06	1.02	0.99	1.00	0.95	0.89
2003	1.00	1.04	1.04	0.99	0.97	1.07	1.04	1.04	0.90	0.92	1.04	0.95
2004	1.01	1.07	1.04	0.98	0.98	1.06	1.07	1.03	0.89	0.94	1.01	0.93
2005	1.05	1.08	1.01	0.96	0.97	1.04	1.06	1.06	0.92	0.93	0.99	0.92
2006	1.01	1.03	0.98	0.95	0.98	1.03	1.00	0.99	0.95	0.99	1.08	1.01
2007	1.02	0.97	0.95	0.94	1.02	1.10	0.99	0.98	0.98	1.02	1.04	1.00
2008	1.02	0.95	1.02	1.00	1.03	1.03	0.95	1.02	1.02	1.02	0.98	0.99
2009	1.05	1.05	1.04	1.00	1.04	1.09	0.95	0.93	0.98	0.96	0.95	0.99
2010	0.97	0.99	0.98	0.97	1.04	1.04	0.94	0.95	1.01	0.94	1.07	1.13
2011	0.95	0.98	0.98	0.97	1.07	1.05	0.94	0.94	1.01	0.96	1.07	1.12
2012	1.03	1.09	1.00	1.01	1.00	0.96	0.93	0.90	1.04	1.01	1.01	1.06
2013	1.07	1.11	1.01	1.00	1.01	1.03	0.90	0.87	1.07	1.03	0.95	0.98

Source: Authors' calculation

71



Good Policy, Sound Economy


Good Policy, Sound Economy

- Estimation results confirm the appreciation trend of VND from 2011.
- VND is 7-11% overvalued in 2013.
- This is the largest disequilibrium in the area.
- Except Philippines, Viet Nam is the only countries maintaining overvaluation in 2012-2013 in the area.



- Applying CGE (Computable general equilibrium) model developed by Viet Nam National University, Hanoi.
- Scenarios: Overvaluation (1%, 5%, 10%);
 Undervaluation (1%, 5%, 10%).
- Six industries are negatively affected by overvaluation: Agriculture, agricultural product processing, laborintensive light industry, heavy industry, and mining.
- Two industries benefit from overvaluation: capitalintensive manufacturing industry and service.


Copyright © VEPR 2015 73



_	Un	dervalu	ation	Ov	Overvaluation				
Scenarios	1%	5%	10%	1%	5%	10%			
Output									
Agriculture	0.43	2.43	5.58	-0.40	-1.69	-2.63			
Mining	0.30	1.58	3.33	-0.29	-1.39	-2.56			
Agricultural product processing	0.44	2.48	5.69	-0.41	-1.72	-2.64			
Labor-intensive light industry	0.92	4.89	10.51	-0.89	-4.18	-7.65			
Heavy industry	0.28	1.45	2.99	-0.28	-1.35	-2.58			
Manufacturing industry	-0.86	-4.36	-8.90	0.86	4.25	8.45			
Service	-1.14	-5.51	-10.54	1.17	6.07	12.81			

Source: Authors' calculation

Copyright © VEPR 2015



	Un	dervalua	aion	Overvaluation					
Scenarios	1%	5%	10%	1%	5%	10%			
Imports									
Agriculture	-0.94	-4.21	-7.36	0.99	5.49	12.53			
Mining	-1.18	-5.32	-9.32	1.25	6.94	15.90			
Agricultural product processing	-1.73	-7.97	-14.46	1.80	9.78	21.83			
Labor-intensive light industry	-0.77	-3.48	-6.08	0.81	4.50	10.21			
Heave industry	-0.56	-2.62	-4.82	0.58	3.10	6.79			
Manufacturing industry	-2.99	-14.48	-27.90	3.04	15.77	33.17			
Service	-2.59	-12.11	-22.35	2.68	14.45	31.86			

Source: Authors' calculation

75

Good Policy, Sound Economy VEPR Impact of overvaluaion on industries (%)

Scenarios	Un	Undervaluaion			Overvaluation		
	1%	5%	10%	1%	5%	10%	
Exports							
Agriculture	1.05	5.54	11.82	-1.02	-4.84	-9.04	
Mining	0.67	3.31	6.54	-0.67	-3.40	-6.88	
Agricultural product processing	1.15	6.02	12.76	-1.12	-5.32	-9.97	
Labor-intensive light industry	1.32	6.89	14.55	-1.29	-6.16	-11.64	
Heave industry	0.54	2.72	5.46	-0.54	-2.70	-5.37	
Manufacturing industry	-0.33	-1.76	-3.86	0.31	1.45	2.64	
Service	-0.22	-1.10	-2.22	0.22	1.09	2.16	

Source: Authors' calculation

Copyright © VEPR 2015


Copyright © VEPR 2015



- Labor-intensive light industry is most affected by overvaluation. 10% overvaluation => output and exports shrink 7.65% and 11.64%.
- Capital-intensive industry benefits because using more imported production input. 10% overvaluation => imports increase 33.07%.
- Overvaluation stimulates consumption. Overvaluation increases output and imports of service.
- => Overvaluation is bad for industries using more domestic production input and good for industries using imported input.



- Average gross profit margin of listed seafood companies fluctuates according to exchange rate movement. This margin decreases from 15% in 2011 to 12% in 2014.
- Notably, the rate of 12% is low in a production industry which has a low revenue to asset ratio => Seafood companies will suffer much difficulty if VND continues going up.



Source: Authors' calculation

Copyright © VEPR 2015






- VND appreciated over 2011-2014, and is 7-11% overvalued.
- ⇒ This negatively affects industries employing domestic production input: Agriculture, agricultural product processing, labor-intensive light industry, heavy industry, and mining. These industries have major contribution to job creation and productivity improvement in the economy.
- Sudden decrease in the number of tourist visiting Viet Nam recently, the re-emergence of net imports should be taken into consideration under the impact of current exchange rate policy
- It is necessary to set up a suitable roadmap to realign the Vietnam dong towards the equilibrium exchange rate.
- The adjustment in exchange rate should be greater than the discrepancy between Viet Nam's and the world's inflation.



Good Policy, Sound Economy





- > Introduction on stress testing
- > Application of stress testing for Viet Nam's banking sector
- Constructing a stress test for selected Vietnamese banks in 2015
- > Conclusion and policy recommendations



VEPR Introduction on stress testing

- The term stress testing, as defined in Blaschke, Jones, Majnoni & Peria (2001), Cihak (2004) or Oura and Schumacher (2012), describes a range of techniques used to assess the vulnerability of a portfolio, an institution, or an entire financial system under different hypothetical events or scenarios.
- It is a quantitative "what if" exercise, estimating what would happen to capital, profits, cash flows, etc. of individual financial institutions or the system as a whole if certain risks were to materialize.
- The scenarios must be extreme/exceptional and plausible.

Copyright © VEPR 2015



By objective

- □ *Microprudential stress testing*: assesses the health of an individual institution, inform supervision of the institution.
- □ *Macroprudential stress testing*: identifies risks of the entire system.

By approach

- □ Bottom-up approach: carried out by individual financial institutions using their own internal data and models, often under common assumptions. Supervisory office then collects results to analyze the whole system.
- Top-down approach: conducted by supervisory authorities (normally central banks), using bank-by-bank data and applying a consistent methodology and assumptions.



By data source

- □ Balance sheet-based: more informative but back-ward looking, data intensive, and hard to update given typical lags in the release of the relevant information.
- □ *Market price-based*: forward looking and easily updated but hard to be applied in under-developed markets.

By number of risk factors

- □ Sensitivity test: involves a single risk factor, easy to conduct but impractical as risk factors tend to occur simultaneously.
- □ Scenario analysis: involves a group of risk factors, requires complicated calculations.

Copyright © VEPR 2015



Component	Research questions	Methodology	
Coverage	Which institutions are important for the exercise?	Analysis of the feature of	
Identification of risk and vulnerabilities	Which are the weak points of the institutions?	the financial system	
Shock calibration	Which event can trigger the vulnerabilities?	Historical, hypothetical, reverse engineering approaches	
Implementation of the scenario	How is the shock transmitted to the macroeconomy?	Main macro and satellite models	
Mapping from macroeconomy to banks' portfolios	How do changing macroeconomic variables affect banks?	Ad hoc statistical methodology depending on risk types	
Interpreting of results	Is the impact relevant? Are countermeasures available? Should emergency plans be implemented		

Copyright © VEPR 2015

Source: Quagliariello (2009) 86



Legal framework

- State Bank of Vietnam (SBV) issues only suggestive regulations on internal models to assess capital, assets and liquidity of banks at Article 4, Circular 36/2014/TT-NHNN on 20/11/2014 capital adequacy and liquidity requirements for credit institutions including branches of foreign banks.
- Stress testing by supervisory authorities
- □ Conducted internally by SBV or National Financial Supervisory Commission (NFSC), and has not been widely published widely.
- Stress testing by financial institutions
- □ The implementation of stress testing in Vietnamese banks is still new, with simple and limited techniques. Moreover, internal stress testing has not attracted interest from management board to be a regular exercise for risk management and capital allocation.

Copyright © VEPR 2015



- Stress testing by international organizations
- Viet Nam has participated in Financial Sector Assessment Program since July 2012 and completed the first assessment in August 2014. However, stress testing was not included in the Report.
- Stress testing in independent studies
- □ Nguyen Minh Sang và Nguyen Thi Thu Trang (2013): liquidity test
- □ Phung Duc Quyen (2013) và Nguyen Hoang Thuy Bich Tram (2014): solvency tests



- Coverage
- Identification of risk and vulnerabilities
- Shock calibration and implementation of the scenario
- Mapping from macroeconomy to banks' portfolios
- Interpretation of results

89



Good Policy, Sound Economy

- Joint Stock Commercial Bank for Investment and Development of Viet Nam
- Viet Nam Bank for Industry and Trade
- Joint Stock Commercial Bank for Foreign Trade
- Asia Commercial Joint Stock Bank
- Viet Nam Export Import Commercial Joint Stock Bank
- Military Commercial Joint Stock Commercial Bank
- Maritime Joint Stock Commercial Bank
- Petrolimex Group Joint Stock Commercial Bank
- Saigon Commercial Joint Stock Bank
- Saigon Hanoi Joint Stock Commercial Bank
- Saigon Thuong Tin Joint Stock Commercial Bank
- Viet Nam Technological and Commercial Joint Stock Bank
- Viet Nam Prosperity Joint Stock Commercial Bank



Country	Year(s)	No. of banks	Proportion of banks' assets
The United States	2009, 2010, 2012	19	66%
Mexico	2012	10	84%
China	2011	17	66%
Turkey	2012	9	80%
The United Kingdom	2011	7	71.1%
Viet Nam	2012	17	70.2%
(Phung Duc Quyen, 2012)			
Viet Nam (this study)	2015	13	68.5%

Copyright © VEPR 2015

91


Good Policy, Sound Economy



VEPR Identification of risk and vulnerabilities

- Credit risk
- Interest rate risk
- Exchange rate risk
- Security price risk

Copyright © VEPR 2015 92





Constructing a VAR model for quarterly GDP growth, inflation, lending rate and nominal VND/USD exchange rate from QI/1996 to QIV/2014, and an ARIMA model for monthly VN-Index from M7/2000 to date, then choosing 1% 'tail' events in probability distribution (for severity and plausibility).

	2013	2014	2015
GDP growth	5.42%	5.98%	2.79%
Inflation	6.59%	2.56%	22.34%
Lending rate	10.37%	8.67%	16.42%
VND devaluation rate		1.03%	10.30%
VN-Index	504.63	545.63	438.58



Choosing extreme episodes of the economy between QI/1996 and QIV/2014, with lowest GDP growth, and highest inflation, lending rate and VND devaluation. For VN-Index, choosing the episode of the largest decrease of the index, and use 2014 index to calculate 2015 index.

	2013	2014	2015
GDP growth	5.42%	5.98%	4.77%
Inflation	6.59%	2.56%	19.89%
Lending rate	10.37%	8.67%	20.10%
VDN devaluation		1.03%	18.68%
VN-Index	504.63	545.63	403.28

Copyright © VEPR 2015

95



Credit risk

- □ Estimating non-performing loans based on banks' loan classification and provision rates required by SBV. It is assumed that for the next financial year, 5% of special mentioned loans would become sub-standard, 20% of sub-standard loans would become doubtful, 50% of doubtful loans would become loss loans and be added to previous year's loss loans.
- □ All types of loans are also assumed to increase by 10% in the next financial year. This assumption is valid as banks often set a target of 13-15% in 2014. These assumptions are also applied in 2015.
- ☐ The predicted non-performing loans are then use to estimate the amount of provisions (based on requirement from SBV)



Interest rate risk

- □ Applying a repricing gap model
- Change in net interest income (ΔNII) is calculated from cumulative repricing gap and change in interest rate, based on the following equation:

ΔNII = CGAP × ΔR

Exchange rate risk


Applying a sensitivity test for net open position. Negative or positive net open position decides whether banks may lose or benefit when exchange rate increases. Information on net open position can be found in the note on currency risk of banks' financial statements.

Copyright © VEPR 2015



Security price risk

- □ Security price risk is calculated as the decrease in value of investment and trading securities in banks' balance sheet.
- Impacts of all risk factors to banks
- □ Credit risk, interest rate risk, exchange rate risk and security price risk will be deducted from banks' profit. If their profit cannot cover these risks, banks' capital will be affected.
- □ Banks' capital and risk-weighted assets, estimated by the methodology of Schmieder, Puhr & Hasan (2011), will be used to calculate banks' CAR in 2015.
- □ Banks' CAR will then be used to estimate SBV's recapitalization cost.




VEPR Conclusion


Good Policy, Sound Economy

- Results of the stress test show the vulnerability of Vietnamese banks under extreme shocks, as their CAR cannot remain above the minimum level required by SBV.
- In this study, authors were unable to collect all data for the whole banking sector, thus the results can only reflect a part of the picture.
- The assessment of credit risk still face difficulties because of the lack of sufficient and reliable time-series data to predict non-performing loans in the future. Liquidity risk and contagion risk still cannot be included in the test.



- Banks should retain more profits or mobilize more capital from current shareholders and external investors. This has not been done in recent years, especially in the absence of practical scheme of non-performing loan disposal
- Banks can also reduce their risk-weighted assets by cutting high-risk assets and increasing low-risk assets, like collecting more debt, keeping more liquid assets and decreasing lending.
- Banks also need to undertake stress tests by themselves or provide information and data for supervisory authorities or researchers.
- Finally, in order to avoid macroeconomic shocks, the banking sector should operate in a stable environment, which is a result of synchronous monetary and fiscal policies, in both short-term and longterm.







- > Introduction
- > Overview of TPP
- **➤ Methodology**
- > Simulation Results
- > Conclusion and policy implications





- Integration always brings opportunities and challenges to participating countries and indirectly affects the outsiders.
- Aim of the study: a quantitative evaluation of potential economic impact of liberalizing trade in goods and services under the TPP on Viet Nam.
- Study uses GTAP data base version 9 (published in 2015) and assumes 100% tariff removal plus reduction in non-tariff barriers



Good Policy, Sound Economy

- Negotiation progress: 12 members and 19 official rounds up to date
- 5 main characteristics: (i) comprehensive market access, (ii) fully regional agreement, (iii) cross-cutting trade issues, (iv) new trade challenges, (iv) living agreement
- The tentative content consists of 29 chapters, of which 14 chapters have finished negotiation up to May 2015, such as: Customs, Services, Government Procurement, Sanitary and Phytosanitary Standards, Temporary Entry, etc.




Exports

- □ Increase continuously, yet unstable share in total exports of Viet Nam, dropping from the peak of about 50% to 38-39% currently.
- □ The US and Japan are two main markets of Viet Nam's exports to TPP partners

Imports

- □ Share of imports from TPP decreases gradually (to 23% of total Viet Nam's imports in 2014), replaced by imports from China (29.6%)
- □ Major partners: Malaysia, Singapore, Japan and the US





- Trade structure by commodities
 - □ Exports
 - Concentrated into labour-intensive industries such as apparel, footwear, furniture, etc.
 - For these commodities, Viet Nam has RCA>1 (Nguyen Hong Son et al., 2014)
 - □ Imports
 - Main imports: machinery, electrical & electronic equipments; mineral fuels, oils & distillation products (account for 35% of imports from TPP partners)
 - Other main imported commodities: plastic; iron&steel (from Japan);



Good Policy, Sound Economy

- Previous studies assessed TPP's impacts on TPP and non-TPP economies, using GTAP database version 8 (baseyear 2007)
 - □ Static CGE: Todsadee, Kameyama và Lutes (2012); Petri, Plummer and Zhai (2012); Kawasaki (2014)
 - □ Dynamic CGE: Itakura and Lee (2012) and Cheong (2013)
- Those studies shows that Viet Nam will gain the largest percentage change in real GDP and welfare




- GTAP Model
- Data and Description
- Assumptions and scenarios
- Simulation results


111




Good Policy, Sound Economy


- The standard GTAP model is a comparative static general equilibrium model of global trade
- It assumes perfect competition, constant returns to scale of production technology, and differentiation of trades based on the place of origin (Armington 1969).















- Non-tariff barriers:
 - □ tariff equivalents of services trade barriers (Thelle, *et al.* (2008), Wang, *et al.* (2009)
 - □ average cost of time delays in trade (Minor, 2013).
- These NTBs are difficult to removed completely due to the existence of nature barriers such as language, etc.
- This study chose the maximum possible reduction of NTBs (by 7%) (Hayakawa and Kimura, 2014)







Assumptions:

- □ No explicit treatment of time
- Perfectly competitive markets
- □ Constant returns to scale production technology
- □ Fixed endowments of primary factor inputs such as land, natural resources, capital, skilled and unskilled labor
- Goods and services are allowed to move across borders but not for the primary factors

Scenarios:

- ☐ Scenario a: Tariff removal for the TPP countries.
- □ Scenario b: a + 7% reduction in non-tariff barriers for TPP countries.
- □ Scenario c: a + 7% reduction in non-tariff barriers for all the 23 regions.


Copyright © VEPR 2015





- Simulation results for real GDP
- Simulation results Investment
- Change in imports and exports
- Simulation results for output
- Change in Demand for skilled and unskilled labor
- Simulation results for Welfare



- Viet Nam's increase in real GDP stands out in percent change for all three scenario, 1.03%, 1.32% and 2.11% respectively.
- Once the global reduction in non-tariff barriers is implemented under the scenario c, then even non-TPP member countries are experiencing gains in real GDP.
- Large increase in investment and consumption in Viet Nam offsetting the considerable increase in imports (11.2%).









Imports


- Change in import volume to Viet Nam is also significantly large in terms of percentage change.
- $\hfill \Box$ Japan shows the largest change in export volume in absolute term (over 33 bil.USD)


Exports


- □ Viet Nam shows negative export volume changes (-2.2 to -3.1 bil.USD or -2.2% to -3.1%).
- ☐ There is a shift of Viet Nam's export destinations away from non-TPP countries to TPP members

Reasons for the decrease in exports

- □ Competition between foreign and domestic firms help lower the world price
- □ Domestic consumption surges (6.9 bil. USD in scenario b) while domestic output increases weakly (2.4 bil. USD), leading to the short of export supply
- □ The inflexibility of sources constraints the utilization of the liberalization










VEPR Change in output

- Corresponding to the larger increases in sectoral export volume, Apparel, LSMnfc, and Textile expand its production approximately by \$5.4 billion, \$3.5 billion, and \$1.3 billion.
- Notice that Util_Cons increases its output to support the large fixed capital formation for investment demand.





Copyright © VEPR 2015

131



- Change in demand for skilled and unskilled labor, Scenario b:
 - In terms of % change, Apparel shows more than 40% change in demand both for un-skilled and skilled labor.
 - □ However, in absolute term measured in million US dollar, Util_Cons resulted in \$0.7, \$0.8, \$0.9 billion for un-skilled labor, and about \$400 million for skilled labor, to meet the investment demand.
 - Note that the sum of the absolute changes will be zero, meaning that the resource constraint is binding so as the expansions and contractions of labor demands are offsetting each other.








- Simulation results show that Viet Nam will experience the largest percentage increase in real GDP and welfare
- This increase thanks mainly to the rise in investment and consumption
- Imports surges while exports decrease, leading to larger trade deficit
- Labour will move from the agricultural sectors towards the more advantage industries (apperal, textiles, footwear and utility services)



- Policy Implications
 - □ Need to pursue institutional reforms and liberalize the primary input factors
 - □ Need to offset the loss in tax revenue due to the tariff removal
 - ☐ In need of suitable supporting policies to promote the industries with comparative advantage
 - □ Encourage research and implementation of suitable technical barriers facing the tariff removal
 - □ Need to attract and utilize the increasing investment flows (both domestic and foreign investment)





- > Introduction
- Methodology
- > The international rice market structure
- The overview of Viet Nam's rice sector
- The structure of Viet Nam's rice market
- The tendency of structural changes in Viet Nam's rice market
- Discussion about selected polices on rice sector
- > Conclusions and policy implications





Traditional Policies: increasing rice production and export

Traditional issues:

- ☐ Farmers are continuously put under the pressure of reducing prices and stand at market risks
- □ Raising the risks of soil quality reduction
- □ Difficulties in finding out export market for the high quality rice
- □ Do not establish Vietnamese own rice brand name
- The international rice market structure changes: growing competitiveness pressure, rice consumption is predicted to decrease slightly from 2030.

Copyright© VEPR 2015




Good Policy, Sound Economy

- Analyzing the international rice market structure -> the basis to determine rice sector orientation
- Identifying Viet Nam's rice market structure, conduct and performance: stakeholders, their functions, power, payoffs, costs and benefits for each payoff
- Determining the impacts of market structure on the sustainable development of Viet Nam's rice market
- Recommend policies based on stakeholders' performance



- The theory of Structure-Conduct-Performance in industrial organization theory
 - □ Divide into two segments
 - The segment of trading paddy rice
 - The segment of trading rice (husked rice)
 - □ Segment of rice export
 - ☐ Identify market structure in each segment
 - □ Identify segment interaction





VEPR Methodology

- Analyzing production model in Mekong Delta
- In-depth interviews in Can Tho and An Giang:
 - □ 72 farmers;
 - □ 07 collectors;
 - □ 10 millers;
 - 05 domestic wholesalers;
 - □ 09 exporter;
 - Local authorities

Copyright © VEPR 2015

143





- Production and Consumption
- Most countries produce rice for provide domestic consumer demand, exports accounts for a relatively small proportion of total rice production in each country
- □ Food securities: Ending stocks amounting to 20-24% of total rice production between 2010-2014

Production and consumption in selected countries, 2014 (thousand tons)

Nation	Production	Production Consumption		Import
China	142,530	146,300		4,168
India	106,540	99,180	10,901	
5 countries in ASI	EAN			
Indonesia	36,300	38,500		1,225
Viet Nam	28,161	22,000	6,325	
Thailand	20,460	10,900	10,969	
The Philipines	12,200	12,850		1,800
Cambodia	4,725	3,650	1,000	
Other countries	125,964	146,713		
Tổng thế giới	476,880	480,093		

Copyright © VEPR 2015 Source: USDA (2015)







Comparisons of CR4 and HHI between Exporting and Importing Countries, 2000-2008

Rice exporting countries have more power for than rice importing countries due to production concentration in Asia

Year	Exporting countries		Importing countries		
	CR4	HHI	CR4	HHI	
2000	0.6246	1244.5196	0.3970	437.3198	
2001	0.6351	1325.3535	0.4562	600.5746	
2002	0.7336	1521.9866	0.4704	588.7627	
2003	0.7109	1389.8240	0.4890	781.4017	
2004	0.7613	1905.5646	0.4463	841.5337	
2005	0.7238	1385.1611	0.5126	1143.0204	
2006	0.6897	1294.9176	0.4695	900.5110	
2007	0.7110	1461.5192	0.4992	899.6914	
2008	0.7028	1474.0022	0.4863	878.8563	

Source: Kang, Kennedy and Hilbun (2009)

Copyright © VEPR 2015

147



Good Policy, Sound Economy


Export competitiveness pressure


- □ In the medium-term, export competitiveness tends to rise
- Towards Self sufficiency strategies for rice import countries like the Philippines, Indonesia and African countries;
- Emerging exporters: Cambodia, India and Myanmar

Emerging exporters and traditional importers 2009 -2014 (thousand ton)

		2009/2010	2010/2011	2011/2012	2012/2013	2013/2014
	India	2,228	4,637	10,250	10,480	10,901
Emerging exporters	Cambodia	750	860	1,000	1,075	1,000
	Myanmar	700	1,075	1,357	1,163	1,300
Traditional importers	Malaysia	907	1,076	1,006	885	989
	Chi	366	575	2,900	3,483	4,168
	Indonesia	1,150	3,098	1,960	650	1,225

Source: 2009/10: USDA (2014a); 2010/11 – 2013/14: USDA (2015)









Viet Nam's rice production

Harvest area for 3 seasons/year increased: using more pesticides, reducing rice quality, soil quality reduction etc.

Changes in intensive farming, 1980-2010

Harvest area (m²)	1980	1990	2000	2010
1 season/year	1,572,800	887,277	431,389	342,250
2 seasons/year	642,500	1,154,046	1,398,062	1,057,366
3 seasons/year	23,000	50,237	237,310	529,270
Total Areas	2,238,300	2,091,560	2,066,761	1,928,886
Total area for cultivation	2,926,800	3,346,080	3,939,443	4,044.792
Cultivation density (season/year)	1.31	1.60	1.91	2.10

Source: ISGMARD (2011)

Copyright © VEPR 2015


VEPR Rice production cost, 2012


Good Policy, Sound Economy


151


	Average cost		
	Cost (thousand VND/ha)	Share (%)	
Seed	1,554	7	
Fertilizers	7,460	35	
Pesticide	987	5	
Irrigation fee	187	1	
Labor (hired)	1,589	7	
Hired equipment	488	2	
Land fee	667	3	
Commercial fee	1,494	7	
Labor (self-employed)	2,841	13	
Interest (bank loan)	1,824	9	
Depreciation	2,361	11	
Sum	21,450	100	


Source: Dao The Anh, Thai Van Tinh, Nguyen Van Thang, and Vu Nguyen (2013)

















Stakeholders	Role	Number	Power	Possible payoffs: Cost s and Benefits
Farmers with Large-scale farming	Cultivate rice	Few	Relatively small proportion	 Stable consumer demand; Stable profit Depend on rice export market High investment for Technology
Farmers with small-scale farming	Cultivate rice	Too many	Sell paddy rice for collectors	- Unstable demand - Seldom have power on price negotiation
Cooperatives	Households cooperate to produce and sell paddy rice	Few	Power in negotiation with collectors	- Hard to cooperate- High transaction cost- Able to negotiate the high price

VIET Nam's rice market structure: Segment of trading paddy rice					
Stakeholders	Role	Number	Power	Possible payoffs: Cost s and Benefits	
Collectors	Purchase paddy rice from farmers, hire or sell to millers; or sell to traders	Too many	More power than farmer when negotiating paddy rice price	-Do not have stable demand - High transaction cost - Low investment, large price gap	
Millers	Purchase directly from farmers, collectors	Many	To collectors, hired to mill	 Scores of choices Various capacities Self-collect to mill, high warehouse cost Hired to mill 	
Exporters Copyright © VEPR 2015	Purchase paddy rice from large scale farming households and self-mill	Few	To large scale farming households	- Just purchase directly from large scale farming households based on their contract - Stable inputs - Risks of export price - Cost for warehouse	



Copyright © VEPR 2015

selling rice


for inputs
- Huge Capital

wholesalers

from millers,

collectors and sell directly to exporters and retailers

Viet Nam's rice market structure: Segment of trading husked rice					
Stakeholders	Role	Number	Power	Possible payoffs: Cost s and Benefits	
Exporters	Self-mill paddy rice from farmers, from suppliers	High concentration	Self-process or collect from other resources	- Buy directly from large farm-sized farmers based on contract - Stable inputs - Risks of rice export price - Cost for warehouse	
Viet Nam Food Association	Provide information; regulate exporters				
Government	- Support enterprises to purchase rice for storage - Negotiate the G2G export Etc.		Not clear		
Copyright © VEPR 2015	5			162	





Policies of protecting 3.8 million hectares of harvest area for national food security
Rigid policy, using land inefficiently when cultivating paddy rice in some areas, supply
surplus.

Policy of forming cooperatives

- □ Must be based on farmers' property right
- □ Accounting for a small proportion of rice production in rice market structure (Thailand, 6%)

Policy of purchasing rice for temporary storage

- □ Low efficiency due to not impact on paddy rice and farmers' benefits
- $\hfill \Box$ Exporters benefit because of subsidized warehouse cost

Policy of building rice warehouse in Mekong Delta

- $\hfill\square$ Enterprises largely build warehouse for husked rice storage instead of paddy rice
- □ Farmers still sell paddy rice to collectors

Policy of conditions on rice exporters

- □ Concentrate rice export on some large enterprises: raise the power when negotiating prices, do not encourage to find out niche market
- □ Create another intermediary: suppliers for exporters.



The international rice market structure:

- Growing competitiveness pressure from global export market: countries importing rice implementing self-sufficiency strategies; countries with their own export potential accelerating rice production; rice consumption in Asian countries is expected to peak in 2030, then remains unchanged or decreases slightly
- · Export power based on ability of establishing rice brand name
- · Low quality rice: food security and the poor

Recommend policy vision:

- Note the natural development potential of the milling firms which could accumulate the capital, establish vertical linkages.
- Transfer the orientation of Viet Nam's rice sector into strongly developing domestic rice market: the domestic market ought to perform an important role in building and testing quality standards, brand name of the rice grains produced in Viet Nam.

Copyright© VEPR 2015



- Recommendation 1: Building and completing Good Manufacturing Practices (GMP) for Vietnam's Rice Mill.
 - ☐ These millers are encouraged to abide by GMP-RM and;
 - Be self-responsible for using rice separators based on world standards of rice separation process.
- Recommendation 2: Abolish VAT imposed on domestic rice consumption to achieve the equality between domestic wholesalers and exporters.
- Recommendation 3: Ease the conditions for rice exporters in Decree 109/2010/ND-CP.
 - Encourage medium-sized enterprises to develop niche market with high quality rice (do not need to abide by Decree 109/2010/ND-CP)




- Recommendation 4: Suggest the government implement more flexible policies when planning 3.8 million hectares for rice cultivation, widening the opportunities for farmers to use the land more effectively. Divide this area into 2 types
 - Areas with absolute competitive advantage of rice cultivation: continue to cultivate rice solely
 - Other areas can cultivate other annual crops if these crops can be more profitable for farmers. The decision on which annual crops should be cultivated in these areas depends entirely on farmers themselves.
- Recommendation 5: Identify depreciation of the irrigation system and infrastructure related to rice cultivation; and add the depreciation to rice price, especially export rice price.
- Recommendation 6: easing the limited harvest area for each household which would encourage land accumulation for farmers to cultivate in large-scale areas.

Copyright© VEPR 2015



- Recommendation 7: support the development of adequate microfinance and insurance system for farmers.
- Recommendation 8: differentiate between commercial rice and storage rice.
 VINAFOOD ought to focus on implementing policies (such as to co-ordinate and supervise the rice purchasing for the food security storage policy); diminish their share of commercial distribution towards giving all of this playing ground for private companies.
- Recommendation 9: VFA should be reformed toward assuring the participation and the voice of the representatives of private enterprises, local authorities and farmers in the association.
- Recommendation10: subsidize costs for the enterprises, coordinating with farmers, establishing paddy rice warehouses instead of rice warehouses, farmers have rights to store temporarily their paddy rice in enterprises' warehouses in the certain time.



Year	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2015
					Scenario 1	Scenario 2
Growth						
(%)	6,24	5,25	5,42	5,98	6,1	6,3
Inflation						
(%)	18,90	6,81	6,04	1,84	1,9	3,2





- Budget deficit is a problem of 2015 and may prolong to 2016. This reflects the economic structure and the management performance of the central and local government. The use of measures to finance the abnormal deficit in 2015 will determine the macro balances in 2016. For instance, in case that the Government borrows from the forex reserves to finance the budget deficit (even making an advance), this will triggers reactions (in confidence) to monetary and fiscal policy.
- The exchange rate is a pressing issue and needs an adjustment to align with movements of the international money market.
- The current macro balance can be weakened in 2016 and may cause a new cycle of inflation – depreciation

Copyright © VEPR 2015



Good Policy, Sound Economy

EPR Fundamental issues

- Given the vulnerability of the banking system, banks may not withstand extreme but plausible shocks. It remains uncertain about the financial soundness of each bank (information asymmetry)
- Orientating production and export industries needs to be more marketized to enhance the competitiveness and the strength of enterprises. Take rice production industry for example, it is recommended to ease the condition for exporters, increase the role of endogenous factor (miller enterprises) to create a foundation for intra-industry vertical integration and form the competitiveness of the industry.
- Viet Nam's benefit from joining TPP is going to be positive and fundamental, which will impact on the economic structure through multiple of channels of effects in industries and areas. The benefit will be greater if the endowments such as capital, labour and land are flexible to move. This correlates strongly with administrative and institutional reforms.




VEPR Policy recommendations

- Flexible monetary policy to realign the VND; maintain or build up forex reserves to strengthen the confidence in monetary policy
- Carry on reforms and restructure of the banking system to create a premise for the recovery of profit margin and recapitalization of the banking system. Restructure high-risk portfolios.
- Apply technical barriers to trade for imported goods and raise awareness about technical barriers erected by export markets.
- Strongly reform the internal institutions to enhance the flexibility of endowments which will facilitate across-border movements.
- Nevertheless, the long-term issues are raising productivity and added value. They requires simultaneous reforms in administration, institution and schemes in each enterprises to increase its productivity and efficiency.

Copyright © VEPR 2015



- In order to be more involved in the integration process, as well as to reap more benefit from the freedom of navigation and marine security, we recommend Viet Nam to proposal for an establishment of the Pan–Asia Marine Economic Cooperation PAMEC). This organization should aim to build a hi-quality marine infrastructure, connecting most significant marine economies between the Indian Ocean and the Pacific Ocean, establishing a united bloc for common prosperity and security.
- PAMEC can be built on the basis of these potential founding member candidates (alphabetical order): Australia, Canada, China, Japan, India, Indonesia, New Zealand, Malaysia, Myanmar, Philippines, Singapore, Sri Lanka, Taiwan, Thailand, Vietnam, and the United States.





Good Policy, Sound Economy

176

Thanks for your attention!

Questions or discussions can be sent to:

Email: nguyen.ducthanh@vepr.org.vn

Viet Nam Institute for Economic and Policy Research,

University of Economics and Business, Viet Nam National University

Room 707, Building E4, 144, Xuan Thuy, Cau Giay

Email: info@vepr.org.vn

Tel: 04.37547506 ext 714/ 0975608677

Fax: 04.37549921